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Chapter 11 - Introduction 
 
In a world where capital, intangibles and high-skill labor are increasingly mobile, countries will 
use tax and non-tax measures to attract such resources. To encourage companies to grow their 
capabilities and to conduct new or expanded economic activities, Singapore offers various tax 
incentives, such as the Development and Expansion Incentive (“DEI”). 2  A company that is 
awarded a DEI certificate will benefit from a concessionary tax rate of either 5% or 10%; 
considerably lower than Singapore’s statutory tax rate of 17%. Singapore is not unique in offering 
these types of incentives: in the ASEAN region, countries like Malaysia3 and Thailand4 also offer 
tax incentives for similar activities as those covered by the DEI. As many of the qualifying 
activities are relatively mobile, these countries will therefore have to compete through their tax 
incentive offering in order to attract the desired economic activities to their territories and maintain 
them there. 
 
In itself, such tax competition may help to foster investment, but in order to prevent it from being 
or becoming harmful (the tax foregone under the tax incentive will not be compensated through 
sufficient economic benefits for the country), the OECD/G205 has formulated certain measures in 
its work on preventing base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), which has culminated in the BEPS 
Action Plan.6 One of the BEPS Actions is BEPS Action 5, which is aimed at countering harmful 
tax competition by emphasizing the importance of transparency and substance. The governments 
of the OECD countries and the other countries that have committed to implementing the BEPS 
recommendations (by joining the Inclusive Framework on BEPS; Singapore is one of them7) have 
agreed to follow the recommendations in BEPS Action 5. 
 
Within the EU, the work in the area of harmful tax competition (for instance, the EU’s Code of 
Conduct work8) has traditionally been focused on preventing a race to the bottom within the EU 
by applying political peer pressure on EU Member States to abolish regimes that are deemed 
harmful. Increasingly, though, the EU has begun expressing a desire to export the notion of what 
it considers “tax good governance” to third countries as well, i.e. countries outside the EU / EEA, 
such as Singapore. This may be effected directly, for instance, by inserting tax good governance 
clauses in a free trade agreement between the EU and the third country and in taking these elements 
                                                     
1 The present author, Dr G.F. Boulogne, is grateful to the Netherlands branch of the International Fiscal Association, 
which gave him financial support for attending the IFA’s Asia – Pacific Regional Conference 2016. This conference 
inspired him to write about the topic of this paper. 
2 For an overview of tax incentives administered by Singapore’s Economic Development Board, see 
https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/how-we-help/incentives-and-schemes.html. 
3 Malaysia introduced the “Principle Hub Incentive Scheme” in 2015, it is administered by the Malaysian 
Investment Development Authority. 
4 Thailand introduced an International Headquarters Regime (IHQ) and International Trading Center Regime (ITC) 
in 2015, which are administered by Thailand’s Board of Investment. 
5 Hereafter briefly referred to as “OECD”. 
6 See the 2015 Final Reports pertaining to all 15 BEPS Actions: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-
reports.htm. 
7 Singapore is one of the 110 countries to have joined the Inclusive Framework on BEPS (at December 2017). See 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf. 
8 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/harmful-tax-competition_en. 
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into account in their aid policies, or indirectly, by economically imposing tax good governance 
principles on the third country through the threat of it being placed on an EU-blacklist and 
subsequently, being faced with EU-wide countermeasures. 
 
Although Singapore, as a sovereign State, is in itself at liberty as to how it designs and administers 
the DEI, there are thus various international tax norms – that can be derived from the OECD’s and 
the EU’s work in the area of harmful tax competition – that influence the DEI’s design and 
administration by Singapore. 
 
On 16 October 2017, the OECD/G20 published a review by the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices 
(“FHTP”) of 164 preferential regimes that were reviewed since October 2015 (“2017 Progress 
Report”).9 Singapore’s DEI10, as a “Headquarters regime”, was treated as “Not harmful”. This 
means that, according to the FHTP, the DEI regime does not have harmful features. The FHTP 
was created when the OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition report was released in 1998 (see section 
3.2.2) and has been mandated to monitor and review tax regimes of jurisdictions globally, focusing 
on the features of preferential regimes. The FHTP comprises of the G20 and OECD countries and 
the European Commission participates in all the meetings of the FHTP. 
 
Soon after, on 5 December 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes.11 Singapore, although subjected to an initial screening 
(see chapter 3) is not on that list. As will be shown in chapter 4, implicitly this means that the 
Council of the European Union considers the DEI acceptable too. 
 
No explanation of why Singapore’s DEI was treated as “not harmful” was provided in the 2017 
Progress Report. It only offers a general outline of approach, process, and criteria used. Similarly, 
while stating the motivations for listing the (initially)12  17 non-cooperative jurisdictions (for 
example, in Korea’s case, having harmful preferential tax regimes and not committing to amending 
or abolishing them by 31 December 2018), it is not mentioned why Singapore is not listed. The 
Council Conclusions contains a “State of play of the cooperation with the EU with respect to 
commitments taken to implement tax good governance principles”, which “records the 
                                                     
9 OECD, Harmful Tax Practices - 2017 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes: Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS: Action 5, 2017. 
10 As will be discussed in chapter 2, the DEI used to cover IP income as well, but that coverage has now been 
abolished / grandfathered. In certain cases, IP income is now covered by a new tax incentive, the IP Development 
Incentive (“IDI”). On the IDI, see F. Loh, H.S. Leng, F. Boulogne, “Singapore introduces IP Development Incentive 
to encourage innovation”, published on http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/singapore-budget-
2017/singapore-introduces-ip-development-incentive-to-encourage-innovation. As an IP regime, the DEI was 
therefore treated as “abolished” in the 2017 Progress Report. The 2017 Progress Report distinguishes between 
“Development and expansion incentive – services” and “DEI – Legal services”, the latter being treated as 
“abolished” under “Miscellaneous regimes” as it will expire on 31 March 2020. The DEI – Legal services will not 
be further addressed in this paper as it is not aimed at the activities in scope of this paper. 
11 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions, The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax 
purposes, Brussels, 5 December 2017, 15429/17. 
12 On 23 January 2018, eight jurisdictions were removed from the list, following commitments at high political level 
by those jurisdictions that eased the EU concerns. Three more jurisdictions were removed on 13 March 2018. See 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-list-of-non-cooperative-jurisdictions/. 
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commitments taken by the screened jurisdiction to address issues identified with respect to the 
criteria agreed by the November 2016 Ecofin Council, grouped under the headings of transparency, 
fair taxation and anti-BEPS measures”. This State of play does not contain any recordings of 
commitments by Singapore, even though Singapore ranked high in all “selection indicators” and 
was flagged in two out of three “risk indicators” in a Scoreboard of all third countries and 
jurisdictions for tax purposes drawn up by the European Commission on 14 September 2016 (see 
chapter 3). 
 
In this article it will be analysed and described what the OECD’s and EU’s norms exactly are that 
influence Singapore’s design and administration of its DEI. This analysis will be relied upon in 
reviewing the FHTP’s conclusion that the DEI is “not harmful” and the decision not to place 
Singapore on the EU’s list of non-cooperative jurisdictions; a decision that suggests that the 
Council of the European Union considers Singapore to have adequately implemented the minimum 
anti-BEPS standards, of which BEPS Action 5 is one. 
 
In chapter 2, relevant aspects of the DEI will be described and specific emphasis will be placed on 
the transparency around elements such as the eligibility criteria, the applicable tax rate and the 
qualifying activities (the “substance”) that are required in Singapore to benefit from the DEI.  
 
Chapter 3 will illustrate the development of the OECD’s and the EU’s norms in the area of harmful 
tax competition; not only in order to identify the norms that currently apply, but also to show where 
those norms have emanated from. 
 
In chapter 4, the DEI’s design and Singapore’s administration thereof will be assessed against the 
norms that were identified and described in chapter 3. It will then be analysed whether the FHTP’s 
and Council of the European Union’s findings can be reconciled with an own assessment against 
those norms. Where gaps are found, an effort will be made find explanations. 
 
This paper finishes with final considerations in chapter 5.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349404 
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Chapter 2 - Singapore’s Development and Expansion Incentive 
 
2.1.Legal basis and delegation 
 
Part IIIB (Development and Expansion Incentive) of the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief 
from Income Tax) Act (Chapter 86) (hereafter: “Part IIIB”) is the legal basis for the DEI. This is 
a different Act than the ‘standard’ Singapore Income Tax Act. Part IIIB is added to this paper as 
Annex I. 
 
The eight different Sections of Part IIIB govern the various aspects of the DEI: 
 
 Interpretation of this Part (section 19I); 
 Application for and issue of certificate to development and expansion company (section 
19J); 
 Tax relief period of development and expansion company (section 19K); 
 International legal services (section 19KA); 
 Recovery of tax subject to concessionary rate (section 19L); 
 Ascertainment of income from qualifying activities (section 19M); 
 Ascertainment of income from other trade or business (section 19N); 
 Deduction of losses (section 19O); 
 Power to give directions (section 19P). 
 
Singapore’s Minister of Trade and Industry has the right to approve a company’s application as a 
“development and expansion company” for a certain “qualifying activity” through the issuance of 
a certificate. See, for instance, section 19J(2): “[t]he Minister may, if he considers it expedient in 
the public interest to do so, approve the company as a development and expansion company for 
the qualifying activity and issue to that company a certificate subject to such conditions as the 
Minister may impose.”  
 
That power, and the other powers in Part IIIB, have been deputed by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry to the Chairman of the Economic Development Board under the Delegation of Powers 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry) (Economic Expansion Incentives) Notification 2006, which has 
come into force on 21 July 2006. According to this Notification, the delegation of powers is 
“subject to the terms and conditions specified in the letter dated 14th July 2006 and any subsequent 
letter addressed to the Chairman.” The present author has not been able to retrieve this letter, nor 
is he aware of any subsequent letters. 
 
2.2.Tax rates 
 
According to section 19J(4)(c) “[e]very certificate issued to a development and expansion 
company must be in respect of a qualifying activity and must specify (…) the concessionary rate 
of tax to be levied for that qualifying activity for the purposes of this Part.”  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349404 
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Sections 19J(5C) – (5E) describe that for new DEI awards, the concessionary rate will be either a 
nominal rate of 5% or 10%. Such rates are considerably lower than Singapore’s statutory 17% 
income tax rate (see section 43 of the Income Tax Act, Rate of tax upon companies). 
 
2.3.Qualifying activity 
 
Any company engaged in a “qualifying activity” may apply for approval as a “development and 
expansion company” (meaning: a company which has been issued with a certificate under section 
19J(2)).13 “Qualifying activity” is defined in section 19I as any of the following: 
 
(a) the manufacturing or increased manufacturing of any product from any industry that would 
be of economic benefit to Singapore; 
(b) any qualifying activity as defined in section 16; and 
(c) such other services or activities as may be prescribed. 
 
The qualifying activities as defined in section 16 are: 
 
a) any engineering or technical services including laboratory, consultancy and research and 
development activities; 
b) computer-based information and other computer related services; 
c) the development or production of any industrial design; and 
d) such other services or activities as may be prescribed. 
 
The Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) (Qualifying Activity) Regulations 
prescribe the “other services or activities as may be prescribed” in paragraph (c) of section 19I 
(Part I) and paragraph (d) of section 16 (Part II): 
 
Part I 
(1) Services and activities which relate to the provision of entertainment, leisure and recreation. 
(2) Publishing services. 
(3) Services which relate to the provision of education. 
(4) Medical services. 
(5) Services and activities which relate to agricultural technology. 
(6) Services and activities which relate to the provision of automated warehousing facilities. 
(7) Financial services. 
(8) Business consultancy, management and professional services. 
(9) Services and activities which relate to international trade. 
(10) Services provided by an auction house. 
 
Part II 
                                                     
13 Section 19J(1A) makes clear that the application may be for more than one qualifying activity. 
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(1) Services and activities engaged in by a company which relate to logistics and freight 
forwarding and which are not approved as shipping-related support services provided by 
the company under section 43ZF of the Income Tax Act (Cap. 134). 
 
2.4.Qualifying income 
 
If the plain vanilla scenario of one qualifying activity is considered, section 19J(5C)(a) stipulates 
that the concessionary DEI rate is levied “upon the expansion income derived by a development 
and expansion company from the qualifying activity” [emphasis added]. It is not further clarified 
under which circumstances income can be considered to be derived “from” a qualifying activity. 
 
Section 19J(6) states that the income from a qualifying activity is (logically) referred to as 
“qualifying income.” Expansion income is then defined in the same subsection as the qualifying 
income “to which the certificate issued under this section relates that exceeds the average 
corresponding income.”  
 
Subsections (7) – (9) contain formulae for determining the “average corresponding income”. But 
subsection (10) gives the Minister the discretion to deviate from that amount: “[n]notwithstanding 
subsections (7), (8) and (9), the Minister may, if he thinks fit, specify any amount to be the average 
corresponding income in substitution of the amount determined under those subsections.” As an 
aside, as regards the signification discretion on the Minister’s side to set the “average 
corresponding income”, it is submitted that this would very likely not have been acceptable within 
the EU in view of the application of the EU State aid rules of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. Such discretion would make it difficult to exclude that 
certain undertakings are not favoured over others and, as a result, receive a ‘selective advantage’.14 
That would not be allowed under the EU State aid rules. Within the EU, it would therefore have 
to be much more specific to on the basis of which criteria the Minister would set the amount. 
 
Section 19M addresses the ascertainment of income from qualifying activities and provides that 
qualifying income, subject to subsections (2) and (3) is “ascertained in accordance with the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act, after making such adjustments as may be necessary to give 
effect to any direction given under section 19P.” Subsections (2) and (3) deal with topics such as 
the deduction of allowances and donations. 
 
2.5.Tax relief period 
 
The initial tax relief period is a period of no more than 10 years and that period may be extended 
for up to five years at a time (section 19k(1) and (2)). As a main rule, the total tax relief period of 
a development and expansion company for a qualifying activity shall not in the aggregate exceed 
20 years (section 19k(3)). 
 
                                                     
14 See, on this point, para  
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The DEI itself has been given a finite lifetime: section 19J(3) stipulates that “no company may be 
approved as a development and expansion company on or after 1 January 2024.” 
 
2.6.Administrative aspects 
 
Pursuant to section 19J(1) a company may apply “in the prescribed form to the Minister for 
approval as a development and expansion company for that qualifying activity.” 
 
Section 19J(2) states that: “the Minister may, if he considers it in the public interest to do so, 
approve the company as a development and expansion company for the qualifying activity and 
issue to that company a certificate subject to such conditions as the Minister may impose.”  
 
There does not seem to be any guidance as to when the approval of a company as a development 
and expansion company can be considered to be “in the public interest”.  
 
Furthermore, it is not clear what the “conditions as the Minister may impose” are. None of the 
sections in Part IIIB give specific examples of such conditions, which suggests that section 19J(2) 
generally authorises the Minister to impose conditions. But it is not clear what those conditions 
should actually address and what the purpose would be of those conditions. Also other subsections 
in Part IIIB refer generally to, for instance, “terms and conditions as he may impose” (section 
19K(1)(b)) and “conditions as the Minister may impose” (section 19K(2)), but they do not clarify 
either what those conditions should address. 
 
Part IIIB does not specifically indicate how long the Minister may take to decide whether he 
approves a company as a development and expansion company. Neither does Part IIIB specify 
whether a company has the right to appeal or object if the Minister explicitly (e.g. he sends a refusal 
letter) or implicitly (e.g. he does not take a decision) does not approve a company as a development 
and expansion company. 
 
The DEI certificates under section 19J(2) are not published.  
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Chapter 3 - International Tax Norms Influencing the Design and Administration of the DEI 
 
3.1.Introduction 
 
Historically, countries had total sovereignty in the design of their tax systems. The potential risk 
of double taxation that would arise as a result of the different tax policy choices made would be 
resolved through unilateral measures for the avoidance of double taxation or through bilateral tax 
treaties. While most countries generally have still kept the legal sovereignty to design their tax 
systems and to express their tax policy choices, that sovereignty has to an extent been constrained 
politically and economically.  
 
Politically, the 110 plus countries that are part of the inclusive forum have committed to 
implementing the minimum standards of the OECD’s BEPS project. This means a political 
commitment to bring that country’s tax system in line with the BEPS recommendations, which 
will be peer reviewed. Elements that are deemed ‘harmful’ under the BEPS criteria would need to 
be abolished. 
 
Economically, a country may be compelled to brings its tax system in line with the standards of 
others, even when those standards are not legally binding upon that state. Not doing so could result 
in the trading with other states and the investment by investors from other states being discouraged 
through sanctions that may be imposed by those other states, such as the application of anti-abuse 
rules, CFC-rules, mandatory withholding taxes or non-tax measures. 
 
In this chapter it will be assessed what the international tax norms are that influence the design and 
administration of the DEI by Singapore and it will be explored what those international tax norms, 
and their sub-norms, exactly entail. 
 
3.2.The OECD’s Norms 
 
3.2.1. Introduction 
The OECD is an intergovernmental economic organisation that consists of 35 countries. Singapore 
is not an OECD member, but “welcomed” the OECD’s recommendations to counter base erosion 
and profit shifting (“BEPS”)15 and in 2015, it joined the Inclusive Framework on BEPS in 2017 
and thereby committed to implementing the four internationally-agreed standards under the 
OECD’s BEPS Project (countering harmful tax practices, preventing treaty abuse, country-by-
country reporting and enhancing dispute resolution) that will be addressed further on in this 
chapter.16 
 
 
                                                     
15 http://www.mof.gov.sg/news-reader/articleid/1536/parentId/59/year/2015. 
16 Singapore is one of the 110 countries to have joined the Inclusive Framework on BEPS (at December 2017). See 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf.  
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The OECD has de facto become “a central global institution for technical tax policy design”.17 A 
key contribution by the OECD has been the production of its OECD Model Tax Convention in 
1963, which was followed by several updated versions, and its explanatory Commentaries to that 
Model Tax Convention. The OECD Model Tax Convention has served as the basis for many 
bilateral tax treaties worldwide and the interpretative value of the Commentary has been widely 
acknowledged. According to certain authors it is even legally binding when OECD Model Tax 
Convention-patterned treaties should be interpreted.18 
 
Tax treaties, amongst others, allocate taxing rights in order to prevent double taxation. They 
contain distributive rules and rules on the methods of avoiding double taxation by the Contracting 
States. Essentially, those rules express whether or not a State is allowed to tax an item of income 
and – typically only in cases of passive income, such as dividends, interest and royalties – those 
rules set a maximum rate of taxation for the Contracting State that only has a secondary right of 
taxation. Tax treaties typically do not impose a maximum rate of tax of the Contracting State with 
a primary right of taxation, such as the State of residence under the ‘business profits’, Article 7, 
nor would they impose a minimum rate of taxation.19 The present author is not aware of a tax treaty 
with a ‘maximum’ or ‘minimum’ tax rate requirement in the ‘business profits’ article. 
 
In various areas has the OECD’s work set the standard, such as its Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, of which the latest version was released in 
2017.20 Those guidelines provide guidance on the application of the “arm’s length principle” and 
are universally embraced by national courts, or also, for example, by Advocate General Bobek in 
his Opinion in the Hornbach-Baumarkt case (before the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)), who 
explicitly referred to those Guidelines.21 The OECD also paved the way for the current Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, which is an international 
body ensuring the implementation of the internationally agreed standards of transparency and 
exchange of information in the tax area. Initially it consisted of mostly OECD countries and was 
created to address the risks to tax compliance posed by non-cooperative jurisdictions but has now 
been expanded to no less than 150 members, with a broader focus.22 
 
While neither the OECD Model Tax Convention nor its Commentaries regulate the design and 
administration of a corporate income tax incentive, such as the DEI, this is different for the 
                                                     
17 A. J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal ‘World Tax Organization’ Through National Responses to E-
Commerce Tax Challenges, Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 8, Issue 1 2006, at pp. 136 and 139. 
18 See e.g. F.A. Engelen, “How ‘Acquiescence’ and ‘Estoppel’ Can Operate to the Effect that the States Parties to a 
Tax Treaty Are Legally Bound to Interpret the Treaty in Accordance with the Commentaries on the OECD Model 
Tax Convention” in: S.C.W. Douma and F.A. Engelen, The Legal Status of the OECD Commentaries, Vol. 1 – 
Conflict of Norms in International Tax Law Series, IBFD, Amsterdam 2008, pp. 51-72. 
19 What is required, though, is that the company is “liable to tax”, see Article 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention. 
20 Available online at: http://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-
enterprises-and-tax-administrations-20769717.htm. 
21 Advocate-General Bobek’s Opinion in Case C-382/16, Hornbach-Baumarkt A-G v Finanzamt Lindau [14 
December 2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:974 (paragraphs 100-101). 
22 http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/. 
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OECD’s work in the area of harmful tax competition. That work has culminated in several 
milestones, such as the Report on “Harmful Tax Competition” in 1998 and the adoption of the 
OECD BEPS Action Plan in 2015, of which BEPS Action 5 is of particular relevance. 
 
3.2.2. Harmful Tax Competition Report 
 
In 1998 the OECD released its report “Harmful Tax Competition – An Emerging Global Issue” 
(“Harmful Tax Competition Report”).23 The Harmful Tax Competition Report was intended “to 
develop a better understanding of how tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes, 
collectively referred to as harmful tax practices, affect the location of financial and other service 
activities, erode the tax bases of other states, distort trade and investment patterns and undermine 
the fairness, neutrality and broad social acceptance of tax systems generally” (para 4). The Harmful 
Tax Competition Report “recognises the distinction between acceptable and harmful preferential 
tax regimes” (para 4). The Harmful Tax Competition Report focuses on (para 6): 
 
“(…) geographically mobile activities, such as financial and other service activities, 
including the provision of intangibles. Tax incentives designed to attract investment in 
plant, building and equipment have been excluded at this stage, although it is recognised 
that the distinction between regimes directed at financial and other services on the one hand 
and at manufacturing and similar activities on the other hand is not always easy to apply. 
The Committee intends to explore this issue in the future. The Committee also recognises 
that there are many economic, social and institutional factors that affect the competitive 
position of a country and the location of economic activities. These factors, however, are 
not the focus of this study.” 
 
The Harmful Tax Competition Report draws a distinction between tax havens and non-haven 
jurisdictions offering harmful preferential tax regimes and it does so for the following reasons 
(para 43): 
 
“[a tax haven] has no interest in trying to curb the “race to the bottom” with respect to 
income tax and is actively contributing to the erosion of income tax revenues in other 
countries. For that reason, these countries are unlikely to co-operate in curbing harmful tax 
competition. By contrast, in the second case, a country may have a significant amount of 
revenues which are at risk from the spread of harmful tax competition and it is therefore 
more likely to agree on concerted action.” 
  
In the OECD’s view, the willingness to co-operate in curbing harmful tax competition and agreeing 
on concerted actions will thus differ between tax havens and non-haven jurisdictions and this 
translates to differences in application of the Recommendations and the Guidelines between the 
two types of jurisdictions (paras 43 and 44). 
 
                                                     
23 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition. An Emerging Global Issue, Paris, 1998. 
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The Harmful Tax Competition Report mentions that the concept of “tax havens” does not have a 
precise technical meaning, but it makes an attempt at a broad categorisation by referring to 
“countries that are able to finance their public services with no or nominal income taxes and that 
offer themselves as places to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of residence” 
as opposed to “countries which raise significant revenues from their income tax but whose tax 
system has features constituting harmful tax competition” (para 42). 
 
This distinction is interesting, as the ability to raise significant revenues from income tax does not 
automatically imply that that the tax rates in that jurisdiction cannot be ‘nominal’ (attracting a 
broad mobile tax base can still generate significant revenue, even when taxed at a low rate). 
Furthermore, a higher nominal tax rate (but with room for significant deductions, allowances etc) 
may not necessarily lead to significant revenues from income tax, certainly not in an economic 
downturn when income levels are lower. Finally, countries make different policy choices, both as 
to the level of public services they (can) offer, and with which types of income they finance those 
services. It is debatable whether such choices should affect a country’s characterisation as tax 
haven, plus countries should also remain free to choose non-income taxes to finance their 
expenditure. 
 
The Harmful Tax Competition Report identifies four key factors in identifying tax havens for the 
purposes of that Report (p. 23): 
 
(a) No or only nominal taxes; 
(b) Lack of effective exchange of information; 
(c) Lack of transparency; 
(d) No substantial activities. 
 
What may be added to these criteria is the “reputation test” that came from a 1987 Report by the 
OECD:24 “does the country or territory offer itself or is it generally recognised as a tax haven?” 
 
If a country is not considered a “tax haven”, it should subsequently be examined whether the tax 
regimes offered by that jurisdiction should be regarded as “harmful preferential tax regimes”. The 
Harmful Tax Competition Report lists four key factors to identify and assess harmful preferential 
tax regimes (paras 60 et seq): 
 
(a) No or low effective tax rates; 
(b) “Ring fencing” of regimes; 
(c) Lack of transparency; 
(d) Lack of effective exchange of information. 
 
The terminology of factor (a) differs from the one used under the “tax haven analysis”, which 
refers to “no or only nominal taxes”. The Harmful Tax Competition Report clarifies factor (a) as 
                                                     
24 OECD, International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Four Related Studies, No.1, 1987, at p. 22. 
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follows (for harmful preferential tax regimes): “[a] zero or low effective tax rate may arise because 
the schedule rate itself is very low or because of the way in which a country defines the tax base 
to which the rate is applied” (para 61).  
 
Factor (b), “ring fencing”, is described in the Harmful Tax Competition Report as a “partly or full 
(…) [insulation] from the domestic economy (para 62).” The Harmful Tax Competition Report 
mentions two forms of such “ring fencing”: (i) the regime restricts benefits to non-residents or (ii) 
investors who benefit from the tax regime are explicitly or implicitly denied access to domestic 
markets (para 62). 
 
It is interesting to see why a lack of transparency, factor (c), is considered problematic. The Report 
gives as key reason that non-transparent regimes “are likely to increase harmful tax competition 
since non-transparent regimes give their beneficiaries latitude for negotiating with the tax 
authorities and may result in inequality of treatment of taxpayers in similar circumstances.” As a 
result “it [will be] harder for the home country to take defensive measures.” (para 63). The Report 
lists two conditions that a tax regime’s administration should normally satisfy to be deemed 
transparent in terms of administrative practices (para 63): 
 
 “[f]irst, it must set forth clearly the conditions of applicability to taxpayers in such a manner 
that those conditions may be invoked against the authorities; second, details of the regime, 
including any applications thereof in the case of a particular taxpayer, must be available to 
the tax authorities of other countries concerned.” 
 
The Harmful Tax Competition Report also contains eight “other factors” that “generally help to 
spell out, in more detail, some of the key principles and assumptions that should be considered in 
applying the key factors themselves” to determine whether or not a preferential tax regime is 
harmful (para 68 et seq): 
 
(a) an artificial definition of the tax base;  
(b) failure to adhere to international transfer pricing principles; 
(c) foreign source income exempt from residence country taxation; 
(d) negotiable tax rate or tax base; 
(e) existence of secrecy provisions; 
(f) access to a wide network of tax treaties; 
(g) the regime is promoted as a tax minimisation vehicle; 
(h) the regime encourages operations or arrangements that are purely tax-driven and 
involve no substantial activities. 
 
The Harmful Tax Competition Report finally contains a set of 15 Guidelines for dealing with 
preferential regimes in OECD Member Countries. The adoption of those Guidelines, according to 
the Harmful Tax Competition Report, would “provide a clear political message that the OECD 
Member countries are prepared to intensify their co-operation to counter harmful tax practices” 
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(para 90). How the OECD Member countries should achieve that result is indicated through a 
series of 15 Recommendations. It is instructive to list Recommendation 5 here: 
 
“Recommendation concerning rulings: that countries, where administrative decisions 
concerning the particular position of a taxpayer may be obtained in advance of planned 
transactions, make public the conditions for granting, denying or revoking such decisions.” 
(p. 44 of the Report) 
 
Recommendation 5 reflects the factor of transparency (factor (c)) as part of the assessment whether 
a preferential tax regime should be considered harmful. 
 
The Harmful Tax Competition Report makes clear that the Recommendations were not only 
intended for OECD Member countries, but also for non-Member countries, like Singapore, and it 
strikes a tone of “encouragement” (para 156): 
 
“[to] retain the spread of harmful tax practices, non-member countries should be associated 
with the Recommendations set out in this Chapter. Whilst the Recommendations in relation 
to tax havens should reduce the amount of displacement to non-member countries, it will 
not eliminate it since it would still be possible to relocate to a non-member country with a 
harmful preferential tax regime. In order to minimise the scope for such displacement, non-
member countries should be encouraged to dismantle harmful preferential tax regimes by 
promoting a broader acceptance of the principles set out in this Report and by engaging in 
a dialogue with the Member countries on how they could apply the Guidelines.” 
 
Based on the four “key factors” and the eight “other factors” discussed above, it has to be 
determined whether a preferential regime should be regarded as potentially harmful. Yet, it may 
not be actually harmful if it does not appear to have created harmful economic effects. According 
to the Report, the following questions can help in making this economic assessment (para 80 et 
seq): 
 
1) Does the tax regime shift activity from one country to the country providing the 
preferential tax regime, rather than generate significant new activity? 
 
2) Is the presence and level of activities in the host country commensurate with the amount 
of investment or income?  
 
3) Is the preferential regime the primary motivation for the location of an activity? 
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We note that the assessment of the DEI against the international tax norms identified and described 
in this chapter will be confined to a legal analysis and will not contain an economic assessment as 
well.25 
 
3.2.3. OECD BEPS Action 5 
 
17 years after the publication of the “Harmful Tax Competition Report”, the OECD released – as 
part of its BEPS package for reform of the international tax system to tackle tax avoidance – its 
Final BEPS Reports in 2015, of which the one relating to Action 5 (“Countering Harmful Tax 
Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance”, “Action 5 Report”) 
is of particular relevance.26 It is relevant to see whether, 17 year later, the factors for a regime 
being considered harmful that could be derived from the Harmful Tax Competition Report are still 
valid, or whether certain factors have been added, removed, or changed. 
 
The Action 5 Report starts with the reinsurance that the Harmful Tax Competition Report has not 
lost its value (p. 9): 
 
“the underlying policy concerns then [in the Report] are as relevant today as they were then. 
Current concerns are primarily about preferential regimes that risk being used for artificial 
profit shifting and about a lack of transparency in connection with certain rulings. The 
continued importance of the work on harmful tax practices was highlighted by the inclusion 
of this work in the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS Action Plan, 
OECD, 2013), whose Action 5 committed the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) to: 
 
Revamp the work on harmful tax practices with a priority on improving 
transparency, including compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related to 
preferential regimes, and on requiring substantial activity for any preferential 
regime. It will take a holistic approach to evaluate preferential tax regimes in the 
BEPS context. It will engage with non-OECD members on the basis of the existing 
framework and consider revisions or additions to the existing framework.” 
 
The Action 5 Report recognises that only the focus may have shifted in the last 17 years (p. 12): 
 
“[m]ore than 15 years have passed since the publication of the 1998 Report but the 
underlying policy concerns expressed in the 1998 Report have not lost their relevance. In 
certain areas, current concerns may be less about traditional ring-fencing but instead relate 
to across the board corporate tax rate reductions on particular types of income (such as 
income from financial activities or from the provision of intangibles.” 
                                                     
25 Although, admittedly, reference is made in this chapter to the Council of the European Council’s (Scoreboard of 
its pre-assessment of all third countries and jurisdictions) “selection indicators”, which serve to indicate economic 
relevance of ties between the third country and the EU. 
26 OECD, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance: 
Action 5 - 2015 Final Report, 2015. 
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This description of current concerns seems right: truly fenced-regimes have become an oddity. 
Tax incentives will typically offer a reduction of corporate income tax (and perhaps other taxes 
too, such as personal income taxes or dividend withholding taxes), in exchange for something 
more lucrative for the host country: jobs and economic growth and with that, the ability to raise, 
for instance, individual income tax from the persons employed by the incentivised company or 
consumption taxes on their spending. Rather than keeping the recipients of the incentives offshore, 
it is actually desired that they move onshore. 
 
The choice of words used – “revamp”, “priority” and “renewed focus” – suggests that the OECD 
member countries see the Action 5 Report as essentially reinforcing Harmful Tax Competition 
Report, but adding a new emphasis on IP regimes (p.23): 
 
“[t]o counter harmful regimes more effectively, Action 5 of the BEPS Action Plan (OECD, 
2013) requires the FHTP to revamp the work on harmful tax practices, with a priority and 
renewed focus on requiring substantial activity for any preferential regime and on 
improving transparency, including compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related to 
preferential regimes.” 
 
“Substantial activity”, which was the above-mentioned eighth “other factor” from the Harmful Tax 
Competition Report in assessing whether a regime is harmful, namely that it is designed in such a 
way that taxpayers may derive benefits from the regime while engaging in operations that are 
purely tax-driven and involve no substantial activities, is effectively now given the same status as 
the four main criteria in the 1998 report. In the OECD’s view, if an operation is purely tax-driven, 
that seems to exclude substantial activities taking place. But when the amounts of tax at stake (and 
the possibilities to engage in tax rate arbitrage) are sufficiently great, taxpayers in a certain 
jurisdiction may be able to move substantial activity to another jurisdiction as a mere ‘cost’ to 
obtaining a larger tax benefit. It remains to be seen whether granting tax treaty benefits to 
arrangements that are purely tax-driven, but nonetheless substantive, can be challenged under the 
proposed “principal purpose test” (as part of BEPS Action 6) that will be implemented by many 
countries (for instance, those signing the Multilateral Instrument) or whether in such a case 
granting treaty benefits is “accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of 
the Covered Tax Agreement.”27 
 
The Action 5 Report subsequently addresses the substantial activity requirement, both in the 
context of IP Regimes and in the context of non-IP regimes. As mentioned in chapter 1, the focus 
in this paper is on the DEI, which, after the introduction of the IDI in Singapore (covering IP 
income), should now be regarded as a non-IP regime.28 The introductory paragraphs of the Action 
                                                     
27 See Article 7(1) of the OECD’s Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To Prevent 
Base Erosion And Profit Shifting. 
28 Income from qualifying IP will not be covered by the IP development incentive; it is at yet unclear whether 
income from non-qualifying IP will remain covered by the DEI. 
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5 Report mention the differences in applying substantial activity requirement to non-IP regimes as 
compared to IP regimes (para 72): 
 
“[w]hen applied to IP regimes, the substantial activity requirement establishes a link 
between expenditures, IP assets, and IP income. Expenditures are a proxy for activities, 
and IP assets are used to ensure that the income that receives benefits does in fact arise 
from the expenditures incurred by the qualifying taxpayer. The effect of this approach is 
therefore to link income and activities. When applied to other regimes, the substantial 
activity requirement should also establish a link between the income qualifying for benefits 
and the core activities necessary to earn the income. As set forth in the 1998 Report, the 
core activities at issue in non-IP regimes are geographically mobile activities such as 
financial and other service activities. These activities may not require anything to link them 
to income because service activities could be seen as contributing directly to the income 
that receives benefits.” 
 
The Action 5 Report then goes on to list eight types of ‘regimes’ and sets out a brief description 
of the type of substantial activities that might be required for the each of those regimes: 
 
 A – Headquarters regime; 
 B – Distribution and service centre regimes; 
 C – Financing or leasing regimes; 
 D – Fund management regimes; 
 E – Banking and insurance regimes; 
 F – Shipping regimes; 
 G – Holding company regimes. 
 
In light of these descriptions, the DEI can be considered to cover (elements of) regimes A,29 B,30 
and G,31 but its scope is broader than that. The guidance under these descriptions as to what 
constitute the relevant substantial activities is therefore of limited guidance. 
 
Having covered the element ‘substance’, the Action 5 Report moves on to ‘transparency’ and with 
this element, the focus is on rulings. Chapter 5 of the Action 5 Report sets out six categories of 
taxpayer-specific rulings which – in the absence of compulsory spontaneous exchange of 
information – could give rise to BEPS concerns. These six categories are (para 91): 
                                                     
29 Headquarter regimes grant preferential tax treatment to taxpayers that provide certain services such as managing, 
co-ordinating or controlling business activities for a group as a whole or for group members in a specific 
geographical area (para 74). 
30 Distribution centre regimes provide preferential tax treatment to entities whose main or only activity is to 
purchase raw materials and finished products from other group members and re-sell them for a small percentage of 
profits. Service centre regimes provide preferential tax treatment to entities whose main or only activity is to provide 
services to other entities of the same group (para 76). 
31 Holding company regimes can be broadly divided into two categories: (i) those that provide benefits to companies 
that hold a variety of assets and earn different types of income (e.g. interest, rents, and royalties) and (ii) those that 
apply only to companies that hold equity participations and earn only dividends and capital gains (para 86). 
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(i) rulings relating to preferential regimes; 
 (ii) unilateral APAs or other cross-border unilateral rulings in respect of transfer pricing; 
 (iii) cross-border rulings providing for a downward adjustment of taxable profits; 
 (iv) permanent establishment (PE) rulings; 
 (v) related party conduit rulings; 
 (vi) any other type of ruling agreed by the FHTP that in the absence of spontaneous 
information exchange gives rise to BEPS concerns. 
 
The Report makes clear that the harmful part – from a transparency perspective – is not per se that 
those rulings represent preferential regimes (p. 46): 
 
“[t]his does not mean that such rulings or the legal or administrative procedures under 
which they are given represent preferential regimes. Instead it reflects countries’ concerns 
that a lack of transparency can lead to BEPS, if countries have no knowledge or information 
on the tax treatment of a taxpayer in a specific country and that tax treatment affects the 
transactions or arrangements undertaken with a related taxpayer resident in their country.” 
 
To enhance transparency, the FHTP has agreed to a framework, described in the FTHP’s 2014 
Progress Report, to spontaneously exchange information pertaining to rulings given in respect of 
preferential regimes, being regimes that (i) are within the scope of the work of the FHTP; (ii) are 
preferential; and (iii) meet the low or no effective tax rate factor. It is relevant to note that, for 
purposes of spontaneously exchanging information, it is not relevant whether a regime has been 
reviewed by the FHTP or has actually been found harmful (p. 49): 
 
“104. The obligation to spontaneously exchange information arises for rulings related to 
any such preferential regime. That is, a regime does not need to have been reviewed or 
found to be potentially or actually harmful within the meaning of the 1998 Report for the 
obligation to arise. Therefore, the obligation will also apply to any ruling (as defined) in 
connection with preferential regimes that have not yet been reviewed or that have been 
reviewed but that have not been found to be potentially or actually harmful and that have 
therefore been cleared.  
 
105. Countries that have preferential regimes that have not yet been reviewed by the FHTP 
will need to self-assess and take a view on whether the filters are satisfied. Where this is 
the case, the obligation to spontaneously exchange information arises immediately, without 
the FHTP first needing to formally review the relevant regime. In case of doubt as to the 
applicability of the filters, it is recommended that the relevant country spontaneously 
exchange information. The expectation is that a country that has a preferential regime 
which has not yet been reviewed by the FHTP will in the meantime self-refer this regime 
for review by the FHTP.” 
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Separate from Action 5, the OECD’s Task Force on Tax and Development has pressed for a more 
effective global transparency framework for tax incentives for investment to promote transparency 
in decision-making processes, increase the information available on costs and benefits, limit 
discretion and increase accountability.32  A set of principles to promote the management and 
administration of tax incentives for investment in a transparent and consistent manner has been 
developed and a summary of these principles is the following:33 
 
1. Make public a statement of all tax incentives for investments and their objectives within 
the governing framework. 
2. Provide tax incentives for investment through tax laws only. 
3. Consolidate all tax incentives for investment under the authority of one government body, 
where possible. 
4. Ensure tax incentives for investment are ratified through the law making body or 
parliament. 
5. Administer tax incentives for investment in a transparent manner. 
6. Calculate the amount of revenue forgone attributable to tax incentives for investment and 
publicly release a statement of tax expenditures. 
7. Carry out periodic review of the continuance of existing tax incentives by assessing the 
extent to which they meet the stated objectives. 
8. Highlight the largest beneficiaries of tax incentives for investment by specific tax provision 
in a regular statement of tax expenditures, where possible. 
9. Collect data systematically to underpin the statement of tax expenditures for investment 
and to monitor the overall effects and effectiveness of individual tax incentives. 
10. Enhance regional cooperation to avoid harmful tax competition. 
 
3.3. The EU’s Norms 
 
The EU – until a/the Brexit – consists of 28 European Member States. Singapore is a ‘third country’. 
At first sight, one could wonder why the EU’s norms should be considered when it comes to the 
design and administration of the DEI by Singapore. A cautious answer to that question is: because 
the EU increasingly seeks to push through a tax policy that would also seek to subject third 
countries to the EU’s standards of tax good governance in order to prevent that the levelling of the 
tax playing field within the EU, both through positive harmonisation (e.g. through the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive and possibly a C(C)TB in the future) as well as negative harmonisation (for 
instance, the European Commission relying on the State Aid instrument to prevent harmful tax 
competition within the EU) would place EU companies at a global competitive disadvantage 
compared to their non-EU counterparts. Although there is no instrument that the EU could rely 
upon to legally bind Singapore unilaterally, investments and trade flows between the EU Member 
States and Singapore are significant (see the table below) and unilateral action by the EU Member 
                                                     
32 IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank, Options for Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use of Tax 
Incentives for Investment, 2015. 
33 IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank, Options for Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use of Tax 
Incentives for Investment, 2015, at p. 32. 
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States could still affect Singapore economically, which forms an important reason for Singapore 
to take account of the EU’s views on tax good governance. The next sections will address: (i) how 
the EU, over the last years, has begun to focus on third countries’ tax good governance, (ii) which 
tax good governance norms the EU wants third countries to adhere to, and (iii) how the EU 
envisages imposing those tax good governance norms on the third countries, both legally (e.g. 
through bilateral trade agreements) and economically (through unilateral measures). The latter, as 
Kalloe rightly observes, seems to become much more important:34 
 
“[w]hereas in the past, the European Union aimed for inclusion of tax good governance 
provisions in various agreements with third countries, it has now achieved a standalone 
political approach that no longer requires the consent of the third country. The listing [of 
third countries, see below] can be imposed on a one-sided basis by way of an EU political 
decision without a clear legal basis [although it has a legal basis within the EU, GFB].” 
 
 Stocks Flows 
 Held by Singapore 
in the EU 
Held by the EU in 
Singapore 
From Singapore 
to the EU 
From the EU to 
Singapore 
Singapore 43,763 102,914 -5,489 8,477 
Table. EU Singapore Trade & Investment 2016 Edition (Millions in €) 
 
Considering the ECJ’s interpretation of the freedom of capital movement, the actual tax regime in 
a third country has never seem to be of much relevance. In its case-law it always seemed ‘sufficient’ 
for the relevant analysis that the third country concerned was, simply, a third country, and not an 
EU Member State. But increasingly, it seems possible to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
third countries under EU tax law. 
 
Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) is the main Treaty 
article on the freedom of capital movements. Of particular relevance is the first paragraph, which 
reads: 
 
“1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the 
movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third 
countries shall be prohibited.” 
 
This freedom of capital movement is the only of the four EU fundamental freedoms (the others 
are: free movement of goods, services and workers) that can be characterised as a true ‘global 
freedom’ as it also extends outside the EU’s territory to third countries. The ECJ has interpreted 
Article 63(1) TFEU in various cases where an EU Member State had a tax provision in place that 
made movements of capital between that Member State and a third country less attractive than 
capital movements within that Member State. In other words, in cases where that tax provision 
                                                     
34 V. Kalloe, “EU Tax Haven Blacklist – Is the European Union Policing the Whole World”, European Taxation, 
No. 2/3 2018, published online. 
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discriminated. Seyad explains that the aim of developing the euro as an international and 
competitive currency was behind the extension of the scope of the free movement of capital to 
third countries as well:35 
 
“[t]he judgment [the Sanz de Lera judgment,36 in which the ECJ held that [the current] 
Article 63 TFEU had direct effect in a case involving capital movement towards third 
countries] should also be viewed in light of the launching of the euro as the single currency 
of some of the member states of the Union in 1999. Even though the Lisbon Treaty does 
not expressly declare that the euro shall be developed as an international and competitive 
currency, the European Union plays a major role in international politics and trade and, to 
that extent, it would like to use its currency as a bargaining tool in such areas. The euro 
cannot develop into an international currency if the free movement of capital is to be limited 
to the geographical limits of the European Union.” 
 
The ECJ has never considered the lack of reciprocity – the third country would not be required to 
remove a similar restriction in its domestic laws – a legitimate justification ground for allowing 
the Member State to restrict the capital movement vis-à-vis the third country. Hindelang and 
Maydell write:37 
 
“[o]n the basis of the telos and the systematics of the treaty, the unilateral liberalization of 
free movement of capital erga omnes is to be perceived as unconditional. Ultimately, 
missing reciprocity is not an argument for a restriction of third country capital movement, 
but the very consequence of this unilateral act. Thus the introduction of mandatory 
requirements pursuing budgetary purposes also based on “lacking reciprocity” in a third 
country context must also be rejected. Closely related to the “lacking reciprocity” argument 
is that of ‘lacking harmonization’ in a third-country context, which also cannot form a valid 
plea to restrict third-country capital movement.” 
 
Kiekebeld and Smit had also discussed whether a lack of reciprocity could be invoked by a 
Member State to justify a restriction imposed by a Member State on the free movement of capital 
in relation to third countries and they wrote that:38 
 
“(…) it follows that accepting the lack of reciprocity in a third country context as a 
justification ground as such would eventually deprive Article 56/63 TFEU of its meaning. 
Given the clear and unconditional wording of the said provisions, this cannot be accepted. 
                                                     
35 S.M. Seyad, “Free Movement of Capital”, in: D. Patterson and A. Södersten (eds.), A Companion to European 
Union Law and International Law, John Wiley & Sons: London 2016, p. 231 et seq. 
36 Joined cases C-163/94, 165/94 and C-250/94, Criminal proceedings against Lucas Emilio Sanz de Lera, 
Raimundo Díaz Jiménez and Figen Kapanoglu [14 December 1995] ECR I-04821. 
37 S. Hindelang and N. Maydell, “The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots” in: M. Bungenberg, 
J. Griebel and S. Hindelang (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law. Special Issue: International 
Investment Law and EU Law, Springer-Verlag: Berlin Heidelberg 2011, at pp. 10-11. 
38 D.S. Smit and B.J. Kiekebeld, “EU Free Movement of Capital and Corporate Income Taxation” in: S.J.J.M. 
Janssen, Fiscal Sovereignty of the Member States in an Internal Market. Past and Future, EUCOTAX Series on 
European Taxation, Kluwer Law International: Alphen aan den Rijn 2011, at p. 147. 
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The lack of reciprocity in a third country context should therefore not, as such, be accepted 
as a justification ground. However, as also indicated by the Netherlands Hoge Raad,39 it 
may be a factor to take into account when assessing the validity of the other justification 
grounds above.” 
 
Repairing a domestic provision that breaches EU law could result in a loss of that Member State’s 
tax revenue. An ECJ decision such as Emerging Markets clarifies that this also has to be accepted 
in a third country context:40 
 
“102 In that respect, suffice it to recall that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-
law, diminution of tax revenue cannot be regarded as an overriding reason in the public 
interest which may be relied upon in order to justify a measure which is, in principle, 
contrary to a fundamental freedom (Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische 
Salinen, paragraph 126). 
 
103 That case-law applies both where the Member State concerned surrenders tax revenue 
in favour of another Member State and where that surrender is in favour of a non-Member 
State. In any event, as observed by the Advocate General in point 127 of his Opinion, the 
Polish companies continue to be liable to taxation on their profits and European Union law 
does not prevent the Member State concerned, in the longer term, from abandoning the 
prevention of double taxation, by obliging it to adopt or maintain measures designed to 
eliminate situations where such double taxation arises.” 
 
If it is not necessary to examine whether the third country would act reciprocally (a lack of 
reciprocity forms no justification ground, after all), is it relevant from an EU tax law perspective 
what the actual tax regime is in the third country? In the realm of the freedom of capital movement, 
the ECJ has indeed accepted certain justification grounds in a third-country context (i.e., Member 
State vis-à-vis third country) that it dismissed in the relationship between Member States. A ground 
that has been submitted by Member States to justify a discriminatory treatment in their domestic 
laws, is that in a cross-border situation, they would lack access to relevant information from the 
other country in order to levy their taxes. In intra-EU situations, that argument has been rejected 
by the ECJ by pointing at the available machinery41 under EU law to obtain that information.42 In 
third country situations, however, this argument was accepted by the ECJ when there was no tax 
treaty in place guaranteeing similar availability of information.43 Still, such an argument relates 
                                                     
39 Dutch Supreme Court. 
40 Case C-190/12, Emerging Markets Series of DFA Investment Trust Company v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w 
Bydgoszczy [10 April 2014] EU:C:2014:249 (paragraphs 102-103). 
41 See e.g. Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, Official Journal of the European Union L 
359/1, 16 December 2014. 
42 See, for instance, Case C-55/98, Skatteministeriet v Bent Vestergaard [28 October 1999] ECR I-07641 (paragraph 
26) and Case C-1/93, Halliburton Services BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [12 April 1994] ECR I-01137 
(paragraph 22). 
43 On this topic, see K. Spies, “Influence of International Mutual Assistance on EU Tax Law”, INTERTAX, October 
2010, pp. 518-530. 
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more to a general aspect of the third country, namely that it is not covered by the EU machinery 
on exchange of information and mutual assistance for the recovery of tax claims, rather than a 
specific aspect of the third country’s tax regime. 
 
Against the backdrop of the developments discussed in the next paragraphs, such as the adoption 
of a common EU list of non-cooperative (third country) jurisdictions for tax purposes, it will be 
interesting to see whether the ECJ will give Member States more leeway to treat transactions with 
certain third countries (‘bad third countries’) less favourably than transactions with ‘good third 
countries’. For instance, would a third country’s presence on the common EU list in itself justify 
a difference in treatment? For transactions between Member States, the ECJ has firmly held that 
“any tax advantage for service providers resulting from the low taxation to which they are subject 
in the Member State in which they are established cannot, by itself, be used by another Member 
State as justification for according less favourable treatment in tax matters to recipients of services 
established in the latter State”.44 It not clear yet if the low taxation in a third country could 
nonetheless be used as justification. 
 
Switching from the ECJ’s case law to the work of the Council of the European Union and the 
European Commission in the area of direct taxation, it does not seem to be until 2007 that a policy 
towards tax good governance by third countries began to develop.45 In that year, the European 
Commission made a start in its Communication46 (a non-binding instrument) on “The application 
of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation”, within the EU and in relation to third 
countries. In that Communication a specific chapter (4) is dedicated to the application of anti-abuse 
rules in respect of third countries in light of the only limited application of the four EU fundamental 
freedoms in a third country context (as mentioned above, only the free movement of capital applies, 
whereas in intra-EU situations all four fundamental freedoms may apply). While the first four 
paragraphs of the short chapter (4) contain technical comments on the application of anti-abuse 
rules in the light of primary and secondary EU law, the last paragraph hints at increased co-
operation between Member States and their non-EU partners in this area: 
 
“[t]he Commission considers that, in particular in respect of application of their anti-
avoidance rules to international tax avoidance schemes, the MSs should, in order to protect 
their tax bases, seek to improve the coordination of anti-abuse measures in relation to third 
countries. Such co-ordination can usefully consist of administrative co-operation, (e.g. 
exchange of information and sharing of best practices). The Commission would also 
                                                     
44 See, for instance, Case C-318/10, Société d’investissement pour l’agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v État belge [5 
July 2012] EU:C:2012:415 (paragraph 39). 
45 See paragraph M of Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 
December 1997 concerning taxation policy, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 2/1, 6 January 1998: 
“The Council considers it advisable that principles aimed at abolishing harmful tax measures should be adopted on 
as broad a geographical basis as possible. To this end, Member States commit themselves to promoting their 
adoption in third countries; they also commit themselves to promoting their adoption in territories to which the 
Treaty does not apply. 
46 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, The application of anti-abuse measures in the area of 
direct taxation – within the EU and in relation to third countries, COM(2007) 785 final, 10 December 2007. 
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encourage MSs, where appropriate, to enhance administrative co-operation with their non-
EU partners.” 
 
The first of several Communications by the European Commission on promoting “Good 
Governance in Tax Matters” came out in 2009 (“2009 Communication”). 47  The 2009 
Communication refers to the European Council (ECOFIN) meeting on 14 May 2008 in which good 
governance in the tax area was defined as meaning the application by countries of “the principles 
of transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition.” In the first place the topic of 
good governance in the tax area (in later Communications it is briefly referred to as “tax good 
governance”) seems to be aimed at stopping EU tax revenues from moving to “tax havens and 
insufficiently regulated financial centres that refuse to accept the principles of transparency and 
information exchange”. Such an outflow would “affect[..] the tax sovereignty of other [read: EU] 
countries and undermine their revenues”. But, further on in the 2009 Communication, it becomes 
clear that the promotion of tax good governance is based on more pillars, including the creation of 
a global level playing field:48 
 
“[f]air and efficient tax systems not only play an essential role in ensuring a level playing 
field for economic relations, trade and investment but also provide the financial basis for 
all public spending. This translates as good governance in the tax area, which is not only 
an essential means of combating cross-border tax fraud and evasion but can also strengthen 
the fight against money laundering, corruption and the financing of terrorism.” 
  
It is explored below how the element of ‘fair tax competition’ is filled in in the 2009 
Communication and in the subsequent Communications. In its description of several of the 
measures that are designed to promote better governance in the tax field within the EU, the 2009 
Communication lists, amongst others: 
 
“[h]armful tax competition – The legal instruments on administrative cooperation are 
complemented by a political agreement between Member States to tackle harmful tax 
competition in the area of business taxation under a peer review process. The "Code of 
Conduct for business taxation" defines harmful tax measures as measures (including 
administrative practices) which affect or may affect in a significant way the location of 
business activity in the Community, and which provide for a significantly lower level of 
taxation than those that generally apply in the Member State concerned. Under the Code, 
which applies both to Member States and to their dependent and associated territories, over 
400 business taxation measures have been assessed and over 100 of these, being considered 
harmful, have been removed or amended. 
 
                                                     
47 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, 
COM(2009) 201 final, 28 April 2009. 
48 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, 
COM(2009) 201 final, 28 April 2009, at p. 4. 
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State aids – In addition, EU State aid policy as applied to fiscal State aids has contributed 
to removing distortions of competition resulting from specific business tax regimes 
introduced by individual Member States.” 
 
The 2009 Communication recognises that the work in the EU on improving tax cooperation 
“reflects many of the underlying principles that have driven OECD activity against harmful tax 
competition over several years.” The criteria in the “Harmful Tax Competition Report” are 
considered “close (although with a narrower scope) to those in the EU’s Code of Conduct for 
business taxation.”49 In the OECD’s 1998 Harmful Tax Competition Report, the OECD’s work on 
harmful tax competition (the Guidelines and the Recommendations ensuing from that Report) had 
already been compared to the EU’s Code of Conduct of Business taxation and, back then, it was 
noted that (para 18): 
 
“[w]hilst the EU Code and the OECD Guidelines are broadly compatible, particularly as 
regards the criteria used to identify harmful preferential tax regimes, and mutually 
reinforcing, the scope and operation of the two differ. The OECD Guidelines are clearly 
limited to financial and other service activities, whereas the Code looks at business 
activities in general, although with an emphasis on mobile activities.” 
 
Turning back to the 2009 Communication, it lists a number of measures in different areas to ensure 
that third countries adhere to good tax governance principles, and those measures include 
exporting the EU’s Code of Conduct criteria to those third countries:50 
 
“Code of Conduct – When adopting the EU Code of Conduct for business taxation, EU 
Member States committed themselves both to ensuring that the principles of abolishing 
harmful tax competition are applied also in Member States’ dependent or associated 
territories and to promoting these principles among third countries. The latter issue is part 
of the 2009 to 2010 work programme of the EU Code of Conduct group. 
 
The 2009 Communication also refers to the Action Plans concluded with countries covered by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy as a source for spreading the EU’s tax good governance gospel 
to third countries: 
 
“European Neighbourhood Policy – A number of Action Plans concluded with countries 
covered by this Policy include general references to cooperation in tax matters. Many also 
make specific reference to the principles of transparency, exchange of information and to 
the Code of Conduct for business taxation.” 
 
                                                     
49 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, 
COM(2009) 201 final, 28 April 2009, at p. 6. 
50 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, 
COM(2009) 201 final, 28 April 2009, at p. 8. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349404 
 27 
 
 
Also State aid rules in agreements signed by the EU (or agreements rendering the body of EU law 
relating to the internal market directly applicable, such as the EEA agreement) may serve to keep 
the playing field between the EU and third countries level:51 
 
“(…) rules equivalent to EU State aid rules are contained in the EEA agreement and 
enforced by the EFTA Surveillance Authority. Similar rules apply to Switzerland under the 
1972 EU-Switzerland Free Trade Agreement. This limits the scope for distortive tax 
regimes in those countries and, in fact, the Commission has recently challenged some Swiss 
business tax regimes granting benefits that it regards as State aids. 
 
Singapore does not have a trade agreement in place with the EU. Although the EU and Singapore 
completed negotiations for a comprehensive free trade agreement in October 2014, the ECJ 
decided in May 2017 that the trade agreement in its current form could not be concluded by the 
EU alone, but would also require ratification by the EU’s 38 national and regional authorities, for 
it also covered areas where the EU did not have exclusive competence.52 
 
The 2009 Communication also refers to including tax good governance clauses in agreements with 
third countries and it states that: 
 
“[t]he content of such agreements should, where appropriate, also include provisions 
similar to those applicable within the EU under State aid rules. This would improve fair 
competition between Member States and third countries in the area of business taxation. It 
should, for example, make it possible to tackle distortive practices unduly detrimental to 
EU Member States’ budgets and businesses, and not necessarily addressed by WTO rules.” 
 
In 2010, the European Commission released a Communication “Tax and Development – 
Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters”53 (“2010 
Communication”) to:54 
 
“improve synergies between tax and development policies by suggesting ways in which 
the EU could assist developing countries in building efficient, fair and sustainable tax 
systems and administrations with a view to enhancing domestic resource mobilisation in a 
changing international environment.” 
                                                     
51 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, 
COM(2009) 201 final, 28 April 2009, at p. 8. 
52 Case C-2/15, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU [16 May 2017]. For a comment on the impact of this 
Opinion by the ECJ, see http://www.straitstimes.com/business/singapore-responds-to-european-court-decision-on-
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53 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, Tax and Development. Cooperating with Developing Countries on 
Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, COM(2010) 163 final, 21 April 2010. 
54 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, Tax and Development. Cooperating with Developing Countries on 
Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, COM(2010) 163 final, 21 April 2010, at p. 2. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349404 
 28 
 
 
 
It lists two international factors that are considered to affect the effectiveness of national tax 
systems in developing countries:55 
 
“[c]ountries might be tempted to encourage foreign direct investments through too costly 
tax incentives and derogations that often fail to attract real and sustainable investment; 
 
The existence of non-cooperative jurisdictions and harmful tax practices, both in developed 
and developing countries, is detrimental also to developing countries by not only having a 
negative impact on their revenues but also by undermining good governance and 
institutional development.” 
 
Two years after the 2010 Communication – which was only focused on the cooperation between 
EU Member States and developing countries – a Communication came out in 2012 “on concrete 
ways to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion including in relation to third countries” 
(“2012 Communication”).56 The 2012 Communication:57 
 
“outlines how tax compliance can be improved and fraud and evasion reduced, through a 
better use of existing instruments and the adoption of pending Commission proposals. It 
also identifies areas where further legislative action or coordination would benefit the EU 
and Member States.” 
 
The 2012 Communication comments on the OECD’s work on tax havens and it identifies two gaps 
in the OECD’s work:58 
 
“Important progress has been made through the almost universal adoption of strong rules 
on information exchange on request and transparency following the successful re-
launching of the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes. However, although many former ‘tax havens’ have committed to these 
principles whether these commitments have been put into practice is only just being 
reviewed. Furthermore the Forum does not consider the question of ‘fair tax competition’, 
a principle which the EU upholds internally via the Code of Conduct for business taxation. 
Promoting such a concept to third countries is relevant both for the OECD and the EU.” 
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2012 also marked the year of another Communication, which contains an “Action Plan to 
strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion” (“2012 Action Plan).59 The 2012 Action 
Plan sets out:60 
 
“concrete steps to enhance administrative cooperation and to support the development of 
the existing good governance policy, the wider issues of interaction with tax havens and of 
tackling aggressive tax planning and other aspects, including tax-related crimes.” 
 
The 2012 Action Plan contains two Recommendations, which form part of a series of initiatives 
presented by the Commission to “ensure a coherent tax policy vis-à-vis third countries, to enhance 
exchange of information and to tackle certain fraud trends.”61 In the first Recommendation the 
Commission mentions that Member States have responded differently to (third country) 
jurisdictions not complying with minimum standards of good governance in tax matters and 
observes that this has the potential of distorting the operation of the internal market:62 
 
“[t]aking into account the freedoms awarded to them when operating in the internal market, 
business may structure arrangements with such jurisdictions via the Member State with the 
weakest response. As a result, the overall protection of Member States’ tax revenues tends 
to be only as effective as the weakest response of any one Member State. This does not 
only erode Member States’ tax bases but also endangers fair competitive conditions for 
business and, ultimately, distorts the operation of the internal market.” 
 
To avoid such distortions arising through unharmonised, unilateral approaches by Member States, 
the Commission recommends more harmonisation, both as regards the criteria to identify the non-
compliant third countries and through a common ‘toolbox’ of counter-measures against those 
countries:63 
 
                                                     
59 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, An 
Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, COM(2012) 722 final, 6 December 2012. 
60 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, An 
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“[w]ith a view to tackling this problem the Commission recommends the adoption by 
Member States of a set of criteria to identify third countries not meeting minimum 
standards of good governance in tax matters and a ‘toolbox’ of measures in regard to third 
countries according to whether or not they comply with those standards, or are committed 
to comply with them. Those measures comprise the possible blacklisting of non-compliant 
jurisdictions and the renegotiation, suspension or conclusion of Double Tax Conventions 
(DTCs). To avoid promoting business with blacklisted third countries, the Commission 
invites Member States to take additional complementary actions but in full respect of EU 
law.” 
 
The other of the two Recommendations in the 2012 Action Plan concerned combatting aggressive 
tax planning within the EU and in order “to provide assistance in preparing its report on the 
application of the two Recommendations, and in its on-going work on aggressive tax planning and 
good governance in tax matters” the Commission announced its plans to establish a Platform for 
Tax Good Governance composed of experts from Member States and stakeholders 
representatives.64 
 
When it comes to the work discussed in the Code of Conduct for business taxation, the 
Commission’s words echo some frustration with the progress made. The Commission calls for an 
“urgent need for a new impetus to be given” and it offers its (continued) assistance to Member 
States “in ensuring the effective promotion of the Code of conduct for business taxation in selected 
third countries and to promote fair tax competition globally by negotiating good governance 
provisions in relevant agreements with third countries and by assisting developing countries in line 
with the Commission’s standing policy on tax and development.”65 
 
With the release of the 2012 Action Plan, also a Study was released – conducted by PwC66 – on 
existing and proposed tax measures of a selected group of EU Member States in relation to non-
cooperative jurisdictions and aggressive tax planning. The data collected showed that:67 
 
“few Member States have a clear definition of the terms "Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions" 
and "Aggressive Tax Planning", although many of them did report having various concepts 
                                                     
64 The Platform for Tax Good Governance, Aggressive Tax Planning and Double Taxation was formally set-up as a 
“Commission Expert Group” through European Commission, Commission Decision of 23.4.2013 on setting up a 
Commission Expert Group to be known as the Platform for Tax Good Governance, Aggressive Tax Planning and 
Double Taxation, C(2013) 2236 final, 23 April 2013. 
65 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, An 
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that are akin to these key concepts. In this respect, it is interesting to note that anti-abuse 
measures in some participating countries apply to countries where the level of taxation is 
inappropriate (e.g. no taxation at all or a very low nominal/effective tax rate), whereas, in 
other Member States, the decisive criterion is the level to which countries cooperate in 
terms of exchange of information (which is more like the OECD approach). However, these 
countries, sometimes featuring on black, grey or white ‘lists’, are not always Third 
Countries.” 
 
With the Action Plan and the PwC Study, a Recommendation was issued regarding measures 
intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax 
matters (“2012 Recommendation”).68 The 2012 Recommendation reiterates the wording from the 
2012 Action Plan that the distortions arising because of Member States’ different responses to non-
compliant third countries (i.e. taxpayers routing their business or their transactions with third 
countries through Member States with the lowest level of ‘protection’) should be remedied 
“through an approach shared by all Member States”. It therefore sets out the criteria to identify 
third countries which do not meet minimum standards of good governance in tax matters and lists 
the actions that Member States may take towards countries that do not meet those standards. 
Applying a carrot-and-stick approach, it also lists actions in favour of third countries that comply 
with them. 
 
The 2012 Recommendation considers good governance in tax matters to be built on three pillars: 
transparency, exchange of information and harmful tax measures. To fill in the minimum standards 
in regards of those three pillars, the Recommendation has recourse to existing standards: 
 
“[i]n regard to transparency and exchange of information, an internationally recognised 
standard has been set out in the Terms of Reference agreed by the Global Forum in 2009. 
Those terms should therefore form the basis of this Recommendation. As far as harmful 
tax measures are concerned, the Code of conduct has proven to be a pertinent reference 
within the Union. Member States have committed themselves to promoting principles of 
that Code in third countries. It is therefore appropriate to refer to the criteria of that Code 
for the purposes of this Recommendation.” 
 
Section 3 of the Recommendation (Minimum standards of good governance in tax matters) lists 
the Terms of Reference agreed by the Global Forum in 2009 (through a referral to the standards 
of transparency and exchange of information set out in the Annex) and also lists the Code of 
Conduct criteria for assessing whether tax measures that provide for a significantly lower effective 
level of taxation (including zero taxation), than those levels which general apply in the third 
country in question are to be regarded as harmful. 
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In 2015 the European Commission listed 5 “Key Areas for Action” in its Communication on a fair 
and efficient corporate tax system in the European Union, 69  which “sets out a (more 
comprehensive European approach to corporate taxation (“2015 Action Plan”).” The 2015 Action 
Plan sets out a series of measures that would “allow for a more cohesive EU approach in relation 
to third countries.” One measure in point is measure 2.3 on “linking preferential regimes to where 
value is generated”. Here the Commission indicates that it will provide guidance to Member States 
on how to bring patent box regimes in line with the “modified nexus approach”. Measure 4.1 is 
about “ensuring a more common approach to third country non-cooperative tax jurisdictions” and 
reference is made to the above-mentioned steps of drawing up a list of third countries which do 
not meet minimum standards of good governance in tax manners through uniform criteria and 
adopting a common set of possible counter-measures against non-compliant third countries. 
 
In January 2016 the European Commission launched its Anti-Tax Avoidance Package, of which a 
Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation 70  forms part (“2016 
Communication”). It addresses the development of a common EU process for assessing and listing 
third countries in regard of their commitment to tax good governance. Interesting is the comment 
that a common EU approach “will also ensure that the specific situation of third countries, 
particularly developing ones, is consistently taken into account.” It is not clear which definition of 
‘developing countries’ is used here, although Singapore would not be among them.71 It is likely 
that this term would have a narrow meaning and cover solely the world’s “least developed 
countries”. Neither is it clear what should be understood by “specific situation”. Would this give 
a country like Singapore, for instance, more leeway in the design of its tax system given its 
“specific situation” (e.g. small, devoid of natural resources)? The Communication is cognizant that 
a common approach to third countries cannot be taken in isolation (“it must be fair objective and 
internationally justifiable. It must also be compatible with EU commitments under multilateral or 
bilateral international agreements”).  
 
A three-step process was proposed as common approach. The first step was the internal 
identification by the Commission of the third countries that should be prioritised for screening on 
the basis of a scoreboard of indicators, which not only reflect the three pillars of tax good 
governance, but also the potential impact of jurisdictions on Member States’ tax bases.  
 
The second step of the listing process was the decision by the Member States which jurisdictions 
should be assessed against the EU’s updated good governance criteria. Part of this assessment 
phase was a dialogue with the third countries in question. 
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The third step of the listing process was the decision which jurisdictions to add to the list of 
problematic tax jurisdictions. The Communication stated that this decision would be “mainly based” 
on a recommendation from the Commission, but also other factors would need to be taken into 
account:72 
 
“[f]or example, some developing countries may show a strong willingness to comply with 
EU good governance standards, but lack the capacity to do so. In such cases, listing may 
not be the most effective tool and alternative instruments may be more effective in 
addressing EU concerns with their tax systems. Similarly, if a third country is already 
formally engaged with the EU to address tax good governance issues, continuing in this 
process may lead to more effective results.” 
 
On the European Commission’s website, the timeline of the three-step process is depicted as 
follows: 
 
 
 
Neither of the two ‘escapes’ for being placed on the EU list ((i) being a developing country or (ii) 
lacking the capacity to comply with EU good governance standards or formally engaging with the 
EU to address tax good governance issues) applied to Singapore. 
 
The Communication gives examples of common counter-measures against listed problematic 
jurisdictions – which “should serve both to protect Member States’ tax bases and to incentivise the 
jurisdiction in question to make the necessary improvements to its tax system” – and it states that:73 
 
“[c]urrently, Member States apply different sanctions or defensive measures to 
jurisdictions on their national lists. These are largely tax-based provisions, such [as] 
Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules or the refusal of normal tax exemptions or 
deductions for payments made to companies in the listed countries.  
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In some cases, these national provisions will be overtaken by the minimum standards in 
the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (e.g. CFC rules). However, the Directive will not cover 
all of the defensive measures that Member States currently apply. The defensive measures 
linked to the common EU list should therefore be a complementary top up to the defensive 
measures in the Directive. Options could include withholding taxes and non-deductibility 
of costs for transactions done through listed jurisdictions. This would make it much less 
attractive for companies to invest or do business in these jurisdictions as the administrative 
burden and risk of double taxation would be higher.” 
 
Unlike in the 2012 Recommendation, it is hard to identify any incentivising actions in favour of 
third countries that comply with the EU’s tax good governance standards (the rabbit seems to have 
eaten the carrot).74 
 
The 2016 Communication also contained two Annexes with “Good Governance Standards in Tax 
Matters” (Annex 1) and an “Update of the Standard Provision on Tax Good Governance for 
Agreements with Third Countries” (Annex 2) respectively.75 Concerning the three pillars of tax 
good governance, they contain an updated overview of the standards that would be considered as 
part of the listing process: 
 
 Transparency and exchange of information on request: the compliance ratings published 
by the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, as a result of the peer reviews it conducts. 
 Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) of financial account information: The 
Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters that 
was approved by the OECD Council on 15 July 2014 (Global Standard) and the compliance 
ratings (of third countries with the Global Standard) that are published by the Global Forum 
as a result of its peer reviews. 
 Fair tax competition: the criteria as provided for in the Code of Conduct on Business 
Taxation endorsed by the Council, as well as practice and guidance agreed by the Code of 
Council [sic] working group. 
 Fair tax competition: The BEPS standards under (particularly) BEPS Actions 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
9-10, 13, 14. 
 Transparency: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) international standards on Combating 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation. 
 
On 14 September 2016, the European Commission presented the Scoreboard of its pre-assessment 
of all third countries and jurisdictions.76 It was reiterated that:  
                                                     
74 It is noted that in their trade agreements with the EU, the “least developed countries” will still obtain favourable 
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“[t]his Scoreboard does not represent any judgment of third countries, nor is it a 
preliminary EU list. It is an objective and robust data source, produced by the Commission, 
to help Member States in the next steps of the common EU listing process.” 
 
The Scoreboard contains both “selection indicators” and “risk indicators”. The selection indicators 
serve to indicate economic relevance of ties between the third country and the EU and they are 
grouped into three dimensions: 
 
 Strength of economic ties with the EU; 
 Financial activity; 
 Stability factors. 
 
Countries that rank above a certain threshold in all three dimensions are featured in Table I of the 
Scoreboard.  
 
The risk indicators serve to assess the potential risk level of the jurisdictions facilitating tax 
avoidance. The risk indicators used were: 
 
 Transparency and exchange of information; 
 The existence of preferential tax regimes; 
 No corporate income tax or a zero corporate tax rate. 
 
Singapore was considered to be one of the “Third Country Jurisdictions” that rank high in all 
selection indicators and it scored as follows: 
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On 8 November 2016, after the publication of the Scoreboard, the Council of the European Union 
adopted the Council conclusions on criteria and process leading to the establishment of the EU list 
of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes.77 The Annex to the Council conclusions not only 
listed the relevant international standards for the three tax good governance elements (tax 
transparency,78 fair taxation and the implementation of BEPS measures) but also set out how a 
jurisdiction should score on each of those elements: 
 
Considering the “Selection indicators” and “Risk indicators” used, it is clear that Scoreboard led 
to a far greater list of possibly non-compliant third countries than the actual lists as it now stands 
after the two rounds of removal (with only 9 countries left on it). Each of those nine countries was 
also on the list of “Third Country Jurisdictions” that rank high in all selection indicators. 
Conceptually, if one would have an EU multinational enterprise in mind with a subsidiary in a 
third country (for instance, to hold the group’s IP or to finance the group companies) one would 
have thought that the assessment of that third country would have zoomed in to a greater extent on 
aspects such as: (i) the tax treaty network between the EU Member States and that country, (ii) 
withholding taxes on outbound payments, (iii) foreign exchange controls. The factors of 
“magnitude of financial activity” and “stability” may be relevant to identify whether that country 
is suitable as a place for situating group’s cash or intra-group receivables, but less suitable for 
identifying whether that country would be positioned to receive the group’s IP income. 
 
1. Tax transparency criteria 
 
Criteria that a jurisdiction should fulfil in order to be considered compliant on tax 
transparency:  
 
1.1 Initial criterion with respect to the OECD Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) 
standard (the Common Reporting Standard – CRS): the jurisdiction, should have 
committed to and started the legislative process to implement effectively the CRS, with 
first exchanges in 2018 (with respect to the year 2017) at the latest and have arrangements 
in place to be able to exchange information with all Member States, by the end of 2017, 
either by signing the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) or through 
bilateral agreements;  
 
Future criterion with respect to the CRS as from 2018: the jurisdiction, should possess at 
least a “Largely Compliant” rating by the Global Forum with respect to the AEOI CRS, 
and 
 
                                                     
77 Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3495th Council meeting, Brussels, 8 November 
2016, 14094/16. 
78 A term that now includes exchange of information, which was previously a separate term. 
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1.2 the jurisdiction should possess at least a “Largely Compliant” rating by the Global 
Forum with respect to the OECD Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR) standard, 
with due regard to the fast track procedure, and 
 
1.3 (for sovereign states) the jurisdiction should have either:  
i) ratified, agreed to ratify, be in the process of ratifying, or committed to the entry into 
force, within a reasonable time frame, of the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance (MCMAA) in Tax Matters, as amended, or  
 
ii) a network of exchange arrangements in force by 31 December 2018 which is 
sufficiently broad to cover all Member States, effectively allowing both EOIR and 
AEOI;  
 
(for non-sovereign jurisdictions) the jurisdiction should either: 
 
i) participate in the MCMAA, as amended, which is either already in force or expected 
to enter into force for them within a reasonable timeframe, or 
 
ii) have a network of exchange arrangements in force, or have taken the necessary steps 
to bring such exchange agreements into force within a reasonable timeframe, which is 
sufficiently broad to cover all Member States, allowing both EOIR and AEOI. 
 
1.4 Future criterion: in view of the initiative for future global exchange of beneficial 
ownership information, the aspect of beneficial ownership will be incorporated at a later 
stage as a fourth transparency criterion for screening.  
 
Until 30 June 2019, the following exception should apply: 
 
– A jurisdiction could be regarded as compliant on tax transparency, if it fulfils at least two 
of the criteria 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3.  
 
This exception does not apply to the jurisdictions which are rated "Non Compliant" on 
criterion 1.2 or which have not obtained at least "Largely Compliant" rating on that 
criterion by 30 June 2018.  
 
Countries and jurisdictions which will feature in the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions 
currently being prepared by the OECD and G20 members will be considered for inclusion 
in the EU list, regardless of whether they have been selected for the screening exercise. 
 
2. Fair taxation 
 
Criteria that a jurisdiction should fulfil in order to be considered compliant on fair taxation:  
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2.1 the jurisdiction should have no preferential tax measures that could be regarded as 
harmful according to the criteria set out in the Resolution of the Council and the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 
1 December 1997 on a code of conduct for business taxation, and  
 
2.2 The jurisdiction should not facilitate offshore structures or arrangements aimed at 
attracting profits which do not reflect real economic activity in the jurisdiction. 
 
3. Implementation of anti-BEPS measures  
 
3.1. Initial criterion that a jurisdiction should fulfil in order to be considered compliant as 
regards the implementation of anti-BEPS measures:  
 
- the jurisdiction, should commit, by the end of 2017, to the agreed OECD anti-BEPS 
minimum standards and their consistent implementation.  
 
3.2. Future criterion that a jurisdiction should fulfil in order to be considered compliant as 
regards the implementation of anti-BEPS measures (to be applied once the reviews by the 
Inclusive Framework of the agreed minimum standards are completed):  
 
- the jurisdiction should receive a positive assessment for the effective implementation of 
the agreed OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards. 
 
It is noteworthy that criterion 2.2 (on Fair taxation) is new: “[t]he jurisdiction should not facilitate 
offshore structures or arrangements aimed at attracting profits which do not reflect real economic 
activity in the jurisdiction.” 
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Chapter 4 
 
Assessing the DEI Against the International Tax Norms 
 
4.1.Introduction 
 
In chapter 3, the international tax norms were identified and described that apply to the design of 
Singapore’s DEI and its administration by the EDB. In this chapter, the DEI is assessed against 
those norms. As the FHTP found in 2017 that the DEI should be regarded as “not harmful” and 
the EU decided only soon thereafter that Singapore should not be regarded as a “non-cooperative 
jurisdiction in taxation matters” (which implicitly means that the DEI is acceptable too), this 
assessment will start on the basis of the two relevant documents by the OECD (the 2017 Progress 
Report) and EU (the December 2017 “EU List of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes”) 
and it will then be analysed whether the FHTP’s and the Council of the European Union’s findings 
can be reconciled with an own assessment against those norms. Where gaps are found, an effort 
will be made find explanations. 
 
4.2.The 2017 Progress Report 
 
The 2017 Progress Report contains the results of the FHTP’s review of jurisdictions’ compliance 
with the BEPS Action 5 minimum standard. As mentioned in the introduction to the 2017 Progress 
Report (para 4): 
 
“[t]here are two aspects to this [review]: whether preferential tax regimes have harmful features; 
and the compulsory spontaneous exchange of information on tax rulings (the “transparency 
framework”). The FHTP has commenced the review of the implementation of the transparency 
framework, the results of which are currently scheduled to be published separately by early 
2018.” 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, as the DEI in its current form can be considered to be a non-IP regime, 
it is relevant that the 2017 Progress Report contains further detail on the FHTP’s approach to the 
application of the substantial activities criterion to non-IP regimes in Annex D, which will be 
covered below. 
 
The last two paragraphs of the first Chapter of the 2017 Progress Report give some clarification 
as to how the review was conducted: 
 
“11. The regimes have generally been reviewed using a thematic approach, whereby regimes 
of a similar nature are reviewed together. The categories of regimes used are those that the 
FHTP has observed in the course of its work. They are presented thematically below: IP 
regimes, headquarters regimes, financing and leasing regimes, banking and insurance regimes, 
distribution and service centre regimes, shipping regimes, holding company regimes, fund 
management regimes and miscellaneous regimes. (…) 
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12. The review involves each jurisdiction which offers a relevant regime completing a 
standardised self-review questionnaire and submitting the relevant legislation to the FHTP. 
Each regime is then discussed at the period meeting of delegates of the FHTP, which includes 
a dialogue with the jurisdiction in order to provide any clarifying information. Decisions are 
reached on a consensus basis, although it is possible where necessary to use a “consensus minus 
one” basis of decision making in relation to the peer review process.” 
 
As one of the 17 Headquarters regimes that were reviewed, the DEI was considered to be “Not 
harmful”. The 2017 Progress Report does not further substantiate that finding. As mentioned above, 
Annex D contains further guidance on applying the substantial activities criterion to non-IP 
regimes, which will often be “a more straightforward and simpler exercise” for those regimes than 
for IP-regimes “as the value creation is primarily driven by the services provided rather than a 
separate IP asset that can be shifted” (para 1). 
 
Non-IP regimes can therefore be found to meet the substantial activity requirement “if they (…) 
granted benefits only to qualifying taxpayers to the extent that those taxpayers undertook the core 
income generating activities required to produce the type of business income covered by the 
preferential regime” (para 2). For a regime outside the EU (as within the EU, the non-
discrimination principle enshrined in the freedom of establishment applies), such as the DEI in 
Singapore, the Annex notes that it is not sufficient that the income generating activities are 
undertaken “by the qualifying taxpayer”, but they must also be undertaken “in the jurisdiction 
providing benefits” (para 7).  
 
According to the Annex: “[c]ore income generating activities presuppose having an adequate 
number of full-time employees with necessary qualifications and incurring an adequate amount of 
operating expenditures to undertake such activities. (…) Such activities could include the 
following: 
 
“Headquarters regimes – The core income generating activities in a headquarters 
company could include taking relevant management decisions; incurring expenditures on 
behalf of group entities; and coordinating group activities (para 8).” 
 
The Annex continues that (para 9): 
 
“[a]long with articulating the core income generating activities that are required for a taxpayer 
to benefit from a regime, jurisdictions providing benefits must (…) also have a transparent 
mechanism to review taxpayer compliance and to deny benefits if these core income generating 
activities are not undertaken by the taxpayer or do not occur within the jurisdiction. 
Jurisdictions must ensure that this mechanism ensures that taxpayers comply.” 
 
The Annex also mentions that (para 10): 
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“(…) jurisdictions would be expected to gather and maintain information on the identity (and 
hence the number) of taxpayers benefitting from the regime. Furthermore, they should gather 
information on the type and level of activity performed. Such information includes information 
on whether the taxpayer performs the core activities for which the regime is designed, the level 
of core activities undertaken, and the number of qualified full-time employees and amount of 
operating expenditures associated with the core activities. Finally, the jurisdiction should 
gather information on the amount of net income for which each taxpayer receives benefits 
under the regime because, for instance, a disproportionately large net income relative to 
benefitting core activities may indicate that other non-benefitting activities/value drivers may 
be responsible for the reported net income.” 
 
The Annex also gives a very relevant example of the application of the substantial activities factor 
to non-IP regimes (para 13): 
 
“Example 2: Headquarters regime. A regime requires taxpayers to carry on headquarters 
activities in the jurisdiction, such as strategic business planning and development, supply chain 
management and co-ordination, and general management and administrative activities, 
including the control and provision of services to related group companies. The regime further 
requires taxpayers to incur at least EUR 3 million in annual business spending and employ an 
adequate number of qualified full-time employees, including managers and professionals, to 
undertake the core activities (and at least ten such employees) in the jurisdiction. The 
jurisdiction requires the taxpayers to report information annually on the income benefitting 
from the regime, as well as the type and level of activity performed to generate the income. 
Taxpayers which do not meet the requirements are denied the regime’s benefits. This regime 
demonstrates that the core income generating activities occur in the jurisdiction and has a 
robust follow-up mechanism to ensure compliance. It therefore satisfies the requirement for 
having substantial activities in the jurisdiction. 
 
The Annex also describes how the monitoring process should take place : 
 
“FHTP monitoring 
14. For non-IP regimes that have been subject to a substantial activities assessment, 
jurisdictions would need to establish monitoring procedures and notify the FHTP of how they 
define core income generating activities and how they review taxpayer compliance with the 
substantial activities requirement. The purpose of such monitoring is not to conduct a transfer 
pricing analysis but instead to confirm that the regime continues to operate consistently with 
the type and level of activities upon which the previous findings of the FHTP were based. 
Jurisdictions would also need to report on an annual basis on: 
 
 the number of taxpayers applying for the regime; 
 the number of taxpayers benefitting from the regime; 
 the type of core activities undertaken by taxpayers benefitting from the regime; 
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 the quantity of core activities undertaken by taxpayers benefitting from the regime (as 
measured by the number of full-time employees and the amount of operating 
expenditures associated with these activities); 
 the aggregate amount of net income benefitting from the regime (…); and 
 the number of taxpayers, if any, that no longer qualify for benefits in whole or in part 
under the regime. 
 
15. To balance the importance of monitoring substantial activities in preferential regimes 
against the administrative burden of collecting the required information, monitoring would 
be required only with respect to taxpayers that are members of multinational enterprise 
groups with annual revenues in the preceding year of EUR 750 million or more – that is, 
taxpayers which are constituent entities of MNE groups required to file CbC reports, as set 
out in the Action 13 Report (OECD, 2015b) and subsequent guidance on CbC reporting. 
Monitoring would also not be required if the small number of taxpayers benefitting from a 
regime means that provision of the above information would have the effect of disclosing 
the identity of the taxpayer, and jurisdictions could establish de minimis exceptions to the 
monitoring requirement to prevent such disclosure. 
 
4.3.Reconciling the 2017 Progress Report’s findings with an own assessment 
 
In this section it will be attempted to reconcile the 2017 Progress Report’s findings, which are 
rather unsubstantiated, with an own assessment of the DEI. First, the Harmful Tax Competition 
Report is resorted to, which – as the BEPS Action 5 Final Report clarified – has kept its relevance. 
 
The question is whether the DEI would have been in focus of that report. Most of the qualifying 
activities under the DEI can be classified as “geographically mobile”,79 but they typically do not 
cover “financial activities”, a term that would be considered to encompass activities such as group 
financing or carrying on of offshore insurance business. Singapore offers other different tax 
incentives for those type of financial activities. 80  But the Harmful Tax Competition Report 
recognises that “the distinction between regimes directed at financial and other services on the one 
hand and at manufacturing and similar activities on the other hand is not always easy to apply” 
(para 6). So even though the DEI does not cover financial activities, this incentive would likely 
have been in scope of the Harmful Tax Competition Report for encouraging “geographically 
mobile” activities. 
 
As Singapore is not a ‘tax haven’, it has to be analysed whether the DEI qualifies as a ‘harmful 
preferential tax regime’ and to reiterate, the relevant criteria were: 
 
                                                     
79 Although some services and activities would be immobile, such as “services and activities which relate to the 
provision of automated warehousing facilities” (see paragraph (c) of section 19I (Part I)): they require automated 
warehousing facilities. 
80 Such as the Finance and Treasury Centre Incentive or the Insurance Business Development scheme (scheduled to 
lapse on 31 March 2020). 
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(a) No or low effective tax rates; 
(b) “Ring fencing” of regimes; 
(c) Lack of transparency; 
(d) Lack of effective exchange of information. 
 
As concessionary rates of either 5% or 10% are awarded, the statutory tax rates can be considered 
to be “low”: a 2017 study by the Tax Foundation, shows that the worldwide average statutory 
corporate income tax rate, measured across 202 tax jurisdictions, is 22.96%.81 In other words: 
significantly higher. Whether the “effective” tax rate under the DEI would also be low, though, is 
less straightforward to say (there is no full consensus as to how one calculates the effective tax rate, 
although, amongst others, the World Bank82 and the OECD83 have given definitions); but it is 
nonetheless assumed that that would typically also be the case, so that criterion (a) would be met. 
 
With the DEI aimed at generating onshore economic activity in Singapore, this incentive should 
not be classified as being ‘ring fenced’ from the normal regime (criterion (b)): non-residents 
carrying on business in Singapore through a branch are also eligible to the DEI and recipients of a 
DEI award are not barred access to Singapore’s domestic market (for completeness’ sake, resident 
companies can access the regime too). 
 
The crucial criterion when analysing whether or not the DEI is to be regarded a “harmful 
preferential tax regime” is whether it lacks transparency (criterion (c)). If the key motivation for 
the OECD for requiring transparency is to avoid inequality of treatment of taxpayers in similar 
circumstances, it may be difficult to describe the administration of the DEI as being fully 
transparent for the reasons set out below. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the issuance of a DEI certificate is discretionary (“the Minister may”) 
and is also subject to a degree of judgment (“if he considers it in the public interest to do so”). 
Furthermore, the issuance of a DEI certificate is possibly subject to such conditions “as the 
Minister may [again, “may”] impose.” But those conditions are not published. As individual DEI 
certificates are not published either, a taxpayer that considers itself in similar circumstances to a 
competitor cannot avail itself of the relevant elements of its competitor’s DEI certificate, such as 
the concessionary grate ranted and the conditions imposed by the Minister. But even if the taxpayer 
would manage to obtain its competitor’s DEI certificate, the discretion and degree of judgment 
assigned to the Minister would not necessarily guarantee that that taxpayer would also be treated 
similarly to its competitor. While one may differ in view as to whether the conditions of 
applicability for the DEI are “set forth clearly” [the wording used in the Harmful Tax Competition 
Report] since Part IIIB gives plenty of guidance about qualifying for the DEI (but perhaps does 
not give all the guidance required), it is at least not clearly specified whether a company has the 
                                                     
81 See https://taxfoundation.org/corporate-income-tax-rates-around-the-world-2017/. 
82 The latest Doing Business study by the World Bank (2018) now uses a “total tax and contribution rate” 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/paying-taxes). 
83 See e.g. this Explanatory Annex, with computations how effective tax rate is derived from statutory tax rate: 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/corporate-and-capital-income-tax-explanatory-annex.pdf. 
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right to appeal or to object if the Minister either explicitly or implicitly does not approve a taxpayer 
as a development and expansion company, even if that taxpayer, for instance, would meet all the 
conditions that were imposed on a competitor in the same circumstances, that leaves open the 
theoretical possibility that some taxpayers are treated more equally than others. 
 
Given Singapore’s commitment to spontaneously exchange rulings under the framework for 
compulsory spontaneous exchange of information under BEPS Action 5,84 Singapore scores a 
passing grade on the “exchange of information” criterion. It is unclear, though, whether Singapore 
also scores points on the second limb of the Harmful Tax Competition Report’s recommendation 
on transparency, namely that details of the DEI regime, including applications thereof in the case 
of a particular taxpayer, must be available to the tax authorities of other countries concerned. In 
the present author’s experience, Singapore has been reluctant in sharing this information.  
 
Of the eight “other factors” that are to be taken into account in assessing the potential harmfulness 
of the DEI, “other factor” (h) seems to be the most relevant one. Para 79 of the Harmful Tax 
Competition Report contains a brief description of this factor: 
 
“[m]any harmful preferential tax regimes are designed in a way that allows taxpayers to 
derive benefits from the regime while engaging in operations that are purely tax-driven and 
involve no substantial activities.” 
 
Read conversely, this factor clarifies that a regime has a smaller chance of being considered 
harmful if it is designed in such a way that the benefits are only open to taxpayers who engage in 
operations that are not purely tax-driven and that also involve substantial activities. Although it is 
not fully clear what is meant by ‘substantial activities’ (as mentioned, the BEPS Action 5 Report 
gives some guidance), the decision to set up the types of activities in Singapore that qualify under 
the DEI would typically be driven by non-tax factors as well (even if the tax factor is a predominant 
one) and it is our experience that the requirements imposed by the EDB on taxpayers to qualify 
for the DEI certainly pertain to the ‘substance’ of the taxpayers in Singapore. Those ‘substance’ 
criteria, however, are not made public. But as will be discussed below, the question is not only 
whether ‘substance’ is required in Singapore, but also whether the right ‘substance’ is required, 
that is: the core activities that actually produce the qualifying income. 
 
As set forth in the Harmful Tax Competition Report, the core activities at issue in non-IP regimes, 
such as the DEI, are geographically mobile activities, such as financial and other service activities. 
These activities may not require anything to link them to income because service activities could 
be seen as contributing directly to the income that receives benefits. Turning to the BEPS Action 
5 Report – which, as mentioned, incorporates the principles of the Harmful Tax Competition 
Report – the question is whether the DEI sufficiently establishes a link between the income 
qualifying for benefits and the core activities necessary to earn the income. Or do the qualifying 
(service) activities contribute directly to the income that receives DEI benefits? As mentioned, 
                                                     
84 See https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/Quick-Links/International-Tax/. 
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Section 19M provides that qualifying income “derived from” a qualifying activity “is ascertained 
in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act.”. And Section 19N clarifies that if the 
development and expansion company not only carries out a qualifying activity, but also another 
trade or business, that in such a case separate accounts must be maintained for that other trade or 
business. Turning to the list of qualifying activities defined in Sections 19I and 16 (through the 
cross-reference in Section 19I) it becomes clear that those qualifying activities are myriad and as 
myriad are the links between those activities and the activities necessary to earn the income from 
them. In some cases, the link will be direct: for instance, for technical services (covered through 
Section 16). But for a manufacturing activity (Section 19I): what exactly is the qualifying income 
“from” it? That remains unclear under the current guidance. 
 
If the entire income of the qualifying company is from a qualifying activity (ignoring any 
‘separation’ issues when the qualifying company also carries out another trade or business), 
Section 19M states that the qualifying income is ascertained “in accordance with the provisions of 
the Income Tax Act”. As Singapore embraces the arm’s length principle,85 this means that – 
in principle – the qualifying income should correspond with the activities performed (also taking 
into account risks incurred, capital employed etc.). But a key question is, in spite of its embracing 
of the arm’s length principle, to what extent Singapore would be inclined to put downward pressure 
on the income level attributed to Singapore by the taxpayer. If the DEI results in a more favourable 
tax rate than can be realised by the taxpayer elsewhere, that taxpayer would generally be inclined 
to overstate the income attributable to the DEI company, while it would be expected that the 
Singapore tax authorities would generally be more inclined to act (read: adjust) in case of an 
understatement, than an overstatement of taxable income. That is particularly true when that 
income would not otherwise have been taxable in Singapore (against the statutory income tax rate 
of 17%). 
 
Turning to the more detailed guidance on the application of the ‘substantial activity requirement’ 
in Annex D of the BEPS Action 5 Report, various questions arise as to the DEI’s compliance with 
this guidance. As mentioned above, it is stated in Annex D that in a non-EU country, such as 
Singapore, the qualifying activities must be undertaken “in the jurisdiction providing benefits” 
(para 7). But in Part IIIB it is not mentioned where the qualifying activities must take place. For 
instance, “computer-based information and other computer related services”, covered by Section 
16, could be performed from virtually anywhere and still produce income that is taxable in 
Singapore. 
 
Resorting to the above-discussed guidance in the Annex that “[c]ore income generating activities 
presuppose having an adequate number of full-time employees with necessary qualifications and 
incurring an adequate amount of operating expenditures to undertake such activities” and that such 
core income generating activities could include “taking relevant management decisions; incurring 
                                                     
85 See also para 3.2 of the PC and DEI brochure on the EDB’s website (available at: 
https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/dam/edb/en/why%20singapore/Incentive-PCandDEI.pdf): “[a]ll business entities 
incorporated, registered or carrying on a business in Singapore must carry out any transaction with any related 
parties at arm’s length and are subject to transfer pricing guidelines.”. 
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expenditures on behalf of group entities; and coordinating group activities (para 8)” it cannot be 
ascertained on the basis of the conditions in Part IIIB that a DEI company would be required by 
the EDB to have such qualified full-time employees or incur such operating expenditures. In 
practice, though, that would be the case. 
 
The present author, therefore, believes that there is rather a lack of full transparency about it, than 
that Singapore does not comply with the ‘substantial activity requirement’. In his experience, the 
EDB always requires substantial activities from DEI companies and this is also mentioned in the 
Pioneer/DEI brochure on the EDB’s website,86 for instance, in para 2.2: 
 
“[t]o qualify, companies must meet quantitative and qualitative criteria. These include the 
employment created (including skills, expertise and seniority), total business expenditure 
which generates spin-off to the economy, as well as commitment to growing the 
capabilities (e.g. technology, skillsets, knowhow) in Singapore. […]” 
 
It is even noted that the EDB’s evaluation of the ‘substantial activity requirement’ seems to bear a 
lot of similarities with the description of Example 2: Headquarters regime in Annex D, which is 
discussed above. 
 
And in spite of the lack of full transparency around the review mechanism (Annex D calls for a 
“transparent mechanism to review taxpayer compliance” (para 9)), it is our experience that the 
EDB critically evaluates a taxpayer’s compliance with the conditions in the DEI certificate. This 
is also mentioned in the abovementioned brochure on the EDB’s website (para 3.1): 
 
“[…] A DEI company must submit regular progress reports to the EDB for the evaluation 
of performance. In the event of any breach of term or condition of the PC or DEI, the 
company is subject to the potential revocation of the incentive and recovery of any 
associated benefits.” 
 
In his experience, the EDB’s evaluation covers the aspects mentioned in Annex D (para 10), such 
as the type and level of activity performed. But again, it is not sufficiently transparent how the 
EDB exactly gathers and maintains this information. 
 
Summarising, in light of the criteria in the Harmful Tax Competition Report, which also remain 
applicable under BEPS Action 5, the DEI should be characterised as a regime that offers a low 
effective tax rate, that is not ring fenced, that is characterised by a degree of transparency (but is 
not as fully see-through as is required) and that is part of a system of exchange of information that 
is embedded within the framework for compulsory spontaneous exchange of information under 
BEPS Action 5, although Singapore has in practice been reluctant in sharing details of the DEI 
regime pertaining to individual taxpayers. Although in our experience the DEI (and the EDB’s 
administration thereof) requires substantial activities to be performed in Singapore, and in doing 
                                                     
86 https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/dam/edb/en/why%20singapore/Incentive-PCandDEI.pdf. 
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so, should comply with the guidance on the “substantial activity requirement”, there is not enough 
transparency around the exact substantial activities required, where those activities are required 
and how a taxpayer’s compliance with the requirement is reviewed. 
 
4.4.The December 2017 “EU List of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes” 
 
As mentioned, on 5 December 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU list of 
non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. It had committed to do so in its Conclusions of 25 
May 2016 and it its Conclusions of 8 November 2016 it had agreed on the criteria and process. 
The Council of the European Union is made up of Government Ministers from each Member State 
(in the case at hand: the Ministers of Finance). Given the topic, the voting was most likely done 
on the basis of unanimity.87 
 
Singapore is not on the list nor are any of the 28 EU Member States on it. Implicitly, this means 
that also Singapore’s DEI should be regarded as “not harmful”, but an individual motivation for 
that conclusion is lacking. There is only the general outline of approach, process, and criteria used. 
Similarly, while stating the motivations for listing the (at that time) 17 non-cooperative 
jurisdictions (for example, in Korea’s case, having harmful preferential tax regimes and not 
committing to amending or abolishing them by 31 December 2018), it is not mentioned why 
Singapore is not listed.  
 
The Council Conclusions contain a “State of play of the cooperation with the EU with respect to 
commitments taken to implement tax good governance principles”, which “records the 
commitments taken by the screened jurisdiction to address issues identified with respect to the 
criteria agreed by the November 2016 Ecofin Council, grouped under the headings of transparency, 
fair taxation and anti-BEPS measures”. This State of play does not contain any recordings of 
commitments by Singapore. That can be seen as surprising, as Singapore ranked high in all 
“selection indicators” and was flagged in two out of three “risk indicators” in the Scoreboard of 
all third countries and jurisdictions for tax purposes drawn up by the European Commission on 14 
September 2016 (see chapter 3). 
 
4.5.Reconciling the December 2017 “EU List of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax 
purposes”’ findings with an own assessment 
 
To understand why Singapore is not on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, the criteria on 
tax transparency, fair taxation and implementation of anti-BEPS measures that were valid when 
the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions was adopted by the Council of the European Union will 
be applied below. 
 
Tax transparency 
 
                                                     
87 On the voting process within the Council of the European Union, see https://mycountryeurope.com/domestic-
politics/eu-domestic-policy/unanimity-qvm-council-vote/. 
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1.1 A jurisdiction should have committed to and started the legislative process to implement 
effectively the OECD Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) standard (the Common 
Reporting Standard – CRS), with first exchanges in 2018 (with respect to the year 2017) at 
the latest and have arrangements in place to be able to exchange information with all 
Member States, by the end of 2017, either by signing the Multilateral Competent Authority 
Agreement (MCAA) or through bilateral agreements. 
 
1.2 A jurisdiction should possess at least a “Largely Compliant” rating by the Global Forum 
with respect to the OECD Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR) standard, with due 
regard to the fast track procedure, and 
 
1.3 A jurisdiction should have either:  
 
i) ratified, agreed to ratify, be in the process of ratifying, or committed to the entry into 
force, within a reasonable time frame, of the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance (MCMAA) in Tax Matters, as amended, or  
 
ii) a network of exchange arrangements in force by 31 December 2018 which is 
sufficiently broad to cover all Member States, effectively allowing both EOIR and 
AEOI;  
 
Until 30 June 2019, the following exception should apply: 
 
– A jurisdiction could be regarded as compliant on tax transparency, if it fulfils at least two 
of the criteria 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3.  
 
Countries and jurisdictions which will feature in the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions 
currently being prepared by the OECD and G20 members will be considered for inclusion 
in the EU list, regardless of whether they have been selected for the screening exercise. 
 
Applied to Singapore: Singapore has made international commitment to commence AEOI under 
the CRS in 201888 and on 21 June 2017 it signed the MCAA on CRS.89 Furthermore, Singapore’s 
overall rating following peer reviews against the standard of EOIR (at November 2017) was 
“largely compliant”.90 In addition, on 20 January 2016, the MCMAA was ratified by Singapore.91 
Singapore therefore complies with criteria 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. 
 
Fair taxation 
                                                     
88 https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/News-and-Events/Newsroom/Media-Releases-and-Speeches/Media-
Releases/2017/Common-Reporting-Standard--CRS--from-1-Jan-2017. 
89 https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/News-and-Events/Newsroom/Media-Releases-and-Speeches/Media-
Releases/2017/Singapore-Signs-Multilateral-Competent-Authority-Agreements-to-Enhance-Tax-Co-operation-on-
Exchange-of-Information. 
90 http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/exchange-of-information-on-request/ratings. 
91 http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf. 
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2.1 The jurisdiction should have no preferential tax measures that could be regarded as harmful 
according to the criteria set out in the Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 1 December 1997 on a code 
of conduct for business taxation, and 
 
2.2 The jurisdiction should not facilitate offshore structures or arrangements aimed at attracting 
profits which do not reflect real economic activity in the jurisdiction. 
 
Applied to Singapore: Turning to criterion 2.2 first, if the analysis is confined to the question 
whether the mere ‘offering’ of the DEI itself should affect Singapore’s absence on the EU’s list of 
non-cooperative jurisdictions (hence disregarding the question whether Singapore “facilitates 
offshore structures etc.” through other tax incentives), it must be concluded that in the present 
author’s view the DEI requires “real economic activity” in Singapore. Again, it is stressed that it 
is not fully clear what, in the Council of the European Union’s view, constitutes “real economic 
activity” and whether the economic activity required in Singapore by the EDB (for purposes of the 
DEI) is also the right economic activity. 
 
Annex VII to the Conclusions of the Council meeting of 5 December 2017, in which the EU list 
of non-cooperative jurisdictions was adopted, contains the “Terms of reference for the 
application of the Code test by analogy” and explains that it has to be ascertained: 
 
 whether a jurisdiction does require a company or any other undertaking (e.g. for its 
incorporation and/or its operations) the carrying out of real economic activities and a 
substantial economic presence:  
 
o "Real economic activity" relates to the nature of the activity that benefits from 
the non-taxation at issue.  
 
o "Substantial economic presence" relates to the factual manifestations of the 
activity that benefits from the non-taxation at issue. 
 
o By way of example and under the assumption that, in general, elements 
considered in the past by the COCG are relevant also for this analysis, the 
current assessment should consider the following elements taking into account 
the features of the industry/sector in question: adequate level of employees, 
adequate level of annual expenditure to be incurred; physical offices and 
premises, investments or relevant types of activities to be undertaken.  
 whether there is an adequate de jure and de facto link between real economic activity 
carried on in the jurisdiction and the profits which are not subject to taxation;  
  
 whether governmental authorities, including tax authorities of a jurisdiction, are 
capable of (and are actually doing) investigations on the carrying out of real 
economic activities and a substantial economic presence on its territory, and 
exchanges of relevant information with other tax authorities;  
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 whether there are any sanctions for failing to meet substantial activities requirements.  
 
The criteria set out in the Code of Conduct for business taxation (conclusions of the Council of 
Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of 1 December 1997 are:92 
 
“Tax measures which provide for a significantly lower effective level of taxation, including 
zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the Member State in question are 
to be regarded as potentially harmful and therefore covered by this code. 
 
Such a level of taxation may operate by virtue of the nominal tax rate, the tax base or any 
other relevant factor. 
 
When assessing whether such measures are harmful, account should be taken of, inter alia: 
 
1 whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents or in respect of transactions 
carried out with non-residents; or 
2 whether advantages are ring-fenced from the domestic market, so they do not affect the 
national tax base, or 
3 whether advantages are granted even without any real economic activity and substantial 
presence within the Member State offering such tax advantages, or 
4 whether the rules for profit determination in respect of activities within a multinational 
group of companies depart from internationally accepted principles, notably the rules 
agreed upon within the OECD, or 
5 whether the tax measures lack transparency, including where legal provisions are 
relaxed at administrative level in a non-transparent way.” 
 
As the DEI provides for a “significantly lower effective level of taxation” (5% or 10%) than the 
level which generally applies in Singapore, it is to be regarded as “potentially harmful”. When 
assessing whether it is actually harmful by having recourse to the five above-mentioned criteria, 
only the fifth criterion seems potentially problematic (for the DEI). As mentioned above, the DEI 
does not lack transparency, but it is not entire clear either whether or not “legal provisions are 
relaxed at administrative level in a non-transparent way.”  
 
Implementation of anti-BEPS measures  
 
3.1. Initial criterion that a jurisdiction should fulfil in order to be considered compliant as 
regards the implementation of anti-BEPS measures:  
 
- the jurisdiction, should commit, by the end of 2017, to the agreed OECD anti-BEPS 
minimum standards and their consistent implementation.  
 
                                                     
92 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/coc_en.pdf. 
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Applied to Singapore: As Singapore has joined the Inclusive Framework for Implementing 
Measures against BEPS, 93 it satisfies this criterion. 
 
Summarising the above own assessment under the three categories of criteria, Singapore fully 
complies with the “tax transparency” and “implementation of anti-BEPS measures” criteria, but 
the lack of full transparency around the process of application for a DEI award, the requirements 
imposed (is compliance with the ‘substantial activity requirement’ ensured?) and the subsequent 
monitoring of those requirements by the EDB may have as consequence that “legal provisions 
are relaxed at administrative level in a non-transparent way”. That would potentially make it 
difficult to comply with “fair taxation” criterion 2.1. The “Terms of reference for the application 
of the Code test by analogy” in Annex VII to the Conclusions of the Council meeting of 5 
December 2017, in which the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions was adopted, suggest that 
the notion of “relaxation at administrative level in a non-transparent way” is broad (and would 
likely affect the EDB’s administration of the DEI): 
 
“More specifically, it has to be assessed whether any elements of the legal system, 
including the granting of tax residence or the setting up of companies can be granted on a 
discretional basis or whether it is bound by the law, verifying whether any legal 
provision, including non-tax provisions, can be deemed to be discretionary in matters 
related to the setting up of a company in that jurisdiction.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
93 https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/News-and-Events/Newsroom/Media-Releases-and-Speeches/Media-
Releases/2016/Singapore-Joins-Inclusive-Framework-for-Implementing-Measures-against-Base-Erosion-and-Profit-
Shifting--BEPS-/. 
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Chapter 5 – Final considerations and recommendations 
 
This paper reviewed the OECD’s and the EU’s assessment of Singapore’s DEI. Assessing regimes 
in numerous jurisdictions (in the OECD’s case, specific regimes; in the EU’s case, jurisdictions as 
such) is a laudable act in the fight of harmful tax competition, but also a tall order. The present 
author is fully appreciative of the efforts required with such a review in a relatively short timeframe 
under intense political pressure. That the EU chose its ‘basket trap’ 3-step-process to come to a 
list of non-cooperative jurisdictions and that the FHTP’s review hinged upon self-assessment by 
the jurisdictions is, therefore, fully understandable. Other, more thorough options, such as full-
blown external reviews, would likely have been too time-and resource-consuming. 
 
In spite of the time pressure and the political scrutiny, though, the 2017 Progress Report and the 
EU’s list of non-cooperative jurisdictions are now out there. From an academic perspective, it is 
fully legitimate to review these assessments now the dust has settled. This was done in this paper 
by performing an own assessment of Singapore’s DEI – a regime that was chosen as a ‘sample’ 
because of the present author’s familiarity with it – against the criteria used by the OECD and the 
EU and by reconciling those findings with the verdict that the DEI is not a harmful preferential tax 
regime and that Singapore is not a non-cooperative tax jurisdiction. 
 
Those two outcomes, also after the own assessment in this paper, are in the present author’s view 
still perfectly defensible: the DEI is not a harmful preferential tax regime. It is a regime 
legitimately chosen by a country in order to attract and maintain those types of economic activities 
that spur actual economic growth. If Singapore would not be allowed to offer companies a regime 
like the DEI, what should it do instead? 
 
But although the verdict on the DEI in the 2017 Progress Report and the absence of Singapore in 
the EU’s list of non-cooperative jurisdictions are understandable, those outcomes are hard to 
justify on the basis of the criteria that were supposedly applied by the FHTP and the Council of 
the European Union. Particularly on the standards of ‘transparency’ and the ‘substantial activity 
requirement’ it seems difficult to conclude on the basis of the relevant legal provisions in, for 
instance, the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act (Chapter 86) or 
Singapore’s Income Tax Act, that the DEI is really sufficiently transparent and that the right 
substantial activities are required for the DEI. Those conclusions can only be drawn on the basis 
of actual experience with the EDB’s thorough and professional administration of the DEI, but that 
is not the test here. 
 
The present author, therefore, recommends the FHTP and the Council of the European Union to 
give much more insight as to why, and on which basis, the verdicts in the 2017 Progress Report 
were ultimately made and why the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions was in the end drawn up 
as it was. It would, for instance, be useful if the self-assessments of the regimes reviewed by the 
FHTP would be made public. And given the various criteria and sub-criteria used, what was the 
grading system that was applied in the end: could non-compliance with one criterion still be 
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compensated by full compliance with other criteria? Absent more guidance on those types of 
questions, only speculation remains. 
 
Take the criterion of transparency, which has a twofold objective of promoting equality of 
treatment of taxpayers in similar circumstances and allowing home countries to take measures. As 
long as DEI certificates are not made public and as long as those certificates are not individually 
exchanged with authorities of other jurisdictions, it remains difficult to ensure that both parts of 
that twofold objective are fulfilled. While the different provisions in Singapore’s laws that were 
addressed in chapter 2 give a good general understanding of the conditions of applicability, it is 
the present author’s experience that the EDB will, understandably, seek to keep some individual 
room for maneuver. Given the discretion given to the Minister to actually award a DEI certificate, 
it does not seem possible for a taxpayer to actually “invoke” the conditions against the authorities 
(and simply ‘demand’ being given a DEI certificate for complying with the conditions) nor would 
the discretion assigned to the Minister always ensure that a taxpayer is treated fully identically to 
another taxpayer in similar circumstances. The processes for “granting, denying or revoking” DEI 
certificates are relatively opaque as well: it is, for instance, unclear when the Minister should 
decide on a DEI request, which types of additional conditions he is allowed to impose, or which 
appeal mechanism (if any) is open to a taxpayer whose request for a DEI certificate is denied. On 
those points, Singapore should offer more transparency. In addition, also towards Singapore’s 
citizens, more transparency on the economic costs and benefits of the DEI (the tax revenue 
foregone versus the favourable overall effects for Singapore, such as investment benefits) is 
desirable, particularly against the backdrop of the principles on “management and administration 
of tax incentives” that were highlighted in chapter 2. Those statistics should be published annually. 
Increased transparency would address the above points and could serve to alter the public 
perception that tax burdens of individuals have gone up, while multinational companies have 
managed to keep their ETRs low by shifting profits around the globe. Transparency will help 
governments and companies in separating facts from fiction and open themselves up to more 
public accountability around the effectiveness and fairness of incentive regimes. Another reason 
for increasing transparency is that multinational companies are increasingly bound by (public) 
CbCR reporting requirements, self-initiated tax transparency paragraphs in their Annual Reports 
and audit standards that require full disclosure of special tax arrangements. In those circumstances, 
trying to preserve some degree of secrecy around tax incentive criteria seems an uphill battle. 
Finally, maintaining some discretion around the exact incentive criteria could arguably allow 
Singapore to offer tailor-made agreements to multinational companies without setting a standard 
for neighbouring, competing jurisdictions to go below. Yet it is the present author’s experience 
that many multinational companies would prefer upfront clarity over post-negotiation certainty. 
And even when the eligibility criteria ultimately agreed upon would be relatively stringent, the 
shadow of secrecy may make other countries imagine them to be relatively light. 
 
On the point of ‘substance’, the 2017 Progress Report refers to the ‘substantial economic activity’ 
requirement (which also applies for purposes of the EU’s list of non-cooperative jurisdictions 
through the standard of ‘implementation of anti-BEPS measures’) which requires that the DEI’s 
benefits be granted only to taxpayers “to the extent that those taxpayers undertook the core income 
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generating activities required to produce the type of business income covered by the preferential 
regime”. Those activities would also have to be undertaken in Singapore. Under the current 
guidance, it is not clear enough whether those criteria are fulfilled. Does the DEI sufficiently 
establish a link between the income qualifying for benefits and the core activities necessary to earn 
the income? When exactly can qualifying income be considered to be “derived from” a qualifying 
activity? How should the level of qualifying income be ascertained, and which standards ensure 
that the qualifying income does not go beyond with what one would expect given the activities 
performed? And for the more mobile activities, is it ensured that all the qualifying activities 
actually take place in Singapore (Part IIB seems to leave this open). And although it is the present 
author’s experience that the EDB requires full-time employees with necessary qualifications and 
the incurring of an adequate amount of operating expenditures to undertake the core income 
generating activities (this is also mentioned in the EDB’s Pioneer/EDB brochure) and critically 
monitors compliance with those ‘substance requirements’ on the DEI certificate, it is 
recommended that more transparency is offered around the actual requirements and their 
monitoring. 
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Annex I – Part IIB (Development and Expansion Incentive) of the Economic Expansion Incentives 
(Relief from Income Tax) Act (Chapter 86) 
  
Interpretation of this Part 
19I. In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires — 
“commencement day”, in relation to a qualifying activity that is approved under section 19J(2) for 
a development and expansion company, means the date specified in the development and 
expansion company’s certificate under section 19J(4)(b) or (5A)(a) or (c) as the commencement 
day of that qualifying activity; 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
“development and expansion company” means a company which has been issued with a certificate 
under section 19J(2); 
“qualifying activity” means any of the following: 
(a) 
the manufacturing or increased manufacturing of any product from any industry that would be of 
economic benefit to Singapore; 
(b) 
any qualifying activity as defined in section 16; and 
(c) 
such other services or activities as may be prescribed. 
[36/96] 
Application for and issue of certificate to development and expansion company 
19J. 
—(1) Any company engaged in any qualifying activity may apply in the prescribed form to the 
Minister for approval as a development and expansion company for that qualifying activity. 
[36/96] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(1A) A company may make an application under subsection (1) to be approved as a development 
and expansion company for more than one qualifying activity which it is engaged in. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(2) The Minister may, if he considers it expedient in the public interest to do so, approve the 
company as a development and expansion company for the qualifying activity and issue to that 
company a certificate subject to such conditions as the Minister may impose. 
[36/96] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(3) No company may be approved as a development and expansion company on or after 1 January 
2024. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(4) Every certificate issued to a development and expansion company must be in respect of a 
qualifying activity and must specify — 
(a) 
the qualifying activity; 
(b) 
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a date as the commencement day of the qualifying activity; and 
(c) 
the concessionary rate of tax to be levied for that qualifying activity for the purposes of this Part. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(5) Where the Minister approves a company as a development and expansion company for 2 or 
more qualifying activities, the Minister may issue a single certificate in respect of those qualifying 
activities if — 
(a) 
the tax relief periods of the development and expansion company for all the qualifying activities, 
as determined by the Minister under section 19K, expire on the same day; and 
(b) 
the Minister is satisfied that the development and expansion company is engaged in all the 
qualifying activities as part of the same project. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(5A) The Minister may, upon the application of any development and expansion company, amend 
a certificate issued to the company — 
(a) 
by substituting for the commencement day of a qualifying activity specified in the certificate under 
subsection (4)(b) such earlier or later date as the Minister thinks fit, and upon such substitution the 
provisions of this Act have effect as if the date so substituted were the company’s commencement 
day of that qualifying activity;  
(b) 
by removing any qualifying activity from the certificate with effect from a date determined by the 
Minister; or 
(c) 
by adding to the certificate any qualifying activity and a date as its commencement day, if — 
(i) 
the tax relief period for the qualifying activity expires on the same day as the tax relief period or 
periods for the other qualifying activity or activities already specified in the certificate; and 
(ii) 
the Minister is satisfied that the development and expansion company is engaged in the qualifying 
activity and the other qualifying activity or activities already specified in the certificate as part of 
the same project. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(5B) Without prejudice to section 99, the Minister may, on the Minister’s own initiative, remove 
any qualifying activity from a certificate with effect from a date determined by the Minister, if the 
Minister is satisfied that the development and expansion company has contravened — 
(a) 
any provision of this Act; or 
(b) 
any condition of its approval as a development and expansion company. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
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(5C) Despite section 43 of the Income Tax Act, tax at the applicable concessionary rate in 
subsection (5D) is levied and must be paid for each year of assessment — 
(a) 
upon the expansion income derived by a development and expansion company from the qualifying 
activity specified in its certificate during its tax relief period for that activity; or 
(b) 
if the certificate specifies 2 or more qualifying activities, upon the expansion income derived by it 
from all of those qualifying activities during its respective tax relief periods for those activities. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(5D) In subsection (5C), the concessionary rate is — 
(a) 
in the case of a development and expansion company approved as such before the date of 
commencement of section 17(d) of the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) 
(Amendment) Act 2016, a concessionary rate of not less than 5%, as the Minister may specify in 
the certificate; or 
(b) 
in any other case, either 5% or 10% as the Minister may specify in the certificate. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(5E) In the case of a development and expansion company that is approved as such on or after 29 
February 2012, or that has been granted on or after that date an extension of its tax relief period or 
periods for any qualifying activity or activities, the concessionary rate of tax applicable to the 
expansion income derived by it — 
(a) 
from the qualifying activity specified in the company’s certificate during any part of the company’s 
tax relief period for that activity mentioned in subsection (5F); or 
(b) 
if the certificate specifies 2 or more qualifying activities, from all of those activities during any 
part of the company’s respective tax relief periods for those activities mentioned in subsection (5F), 
at any time on or after the date of the approval or during the extension period (as the case may be), 
is the rate specified by the Minister to the company, which must not be less than — 
 
where A 
is the concessionary rate of tax applicable to the 
company’s expansion income derived by it from 
that activity or those activities (as the case may be) 
immediately before the commencement of that part 
of the tax relief period or those tax relief periods. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(5F) In subsection (5E), the parts of a tax relief period for a qualifying activity are — 
(a) 
the beginning of the 11th year of the tax relief period to the end of the 15th year of, or the end of, 
the tax relief period, whichever is earlier; 
(b) 
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the beginning of the 16th year of the tax relief period to the end of the 20th year of, or the end of, 
the tax relief period, whichever is earlier; 
(c) 
the beginning of the 21st year of the tax relief period to the end of the 30th year of, or the end of, 
the tax relief period, whichever is earlier; and 
(d) 
the beginning of the 31st year of the tax relief period to the end of the 40th year of, or the end of, 
the tax relief period, whichever is earlier. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(6) The expansion income shall be the income from such qualifying activity or activities (referred 
to in this section and section 19M as qualifying income) to which the certificate issued under this 
section relates that exceeds the average corresponding income. 
[36/96; 11/2004] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(7) The average corresponding income referred to in subsection (6) shall be determined by taking 
one-third of the total of the corresponding qualifying income for the 3 years immediately preceding 
the commencement day specified in the certificate issued under this section from that qualifying 
activity or those qualifying activities. 
[36/96; 11/2004] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(8) Where a development and expansion company which has been approved as such at any time 
before the date the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) (Amendment) Act 
2012 is published in the Gazette, and has been granted a tax relief period of at least 10 years, is 
granted at any time before that date an extension or a further extension of its tax relief period under 
section 19K(1)(b) or (2), the Minister shall compute the average corresponding income for each 
such extension or further extension in accordance with subsection (9). 
[48/2004] 
[Act 1 of 2012 wef 29/02/2012] 
(9) The average corresponding income for each extension or further extension referred to in 
subsection (8) shall be determined by taking one-third of the total of the corresponding qualifying 
income for the 3 years immediately preceding the date of that extension or further extension of its 
tax relief period, as the case may be. 
[48/2004] 
(10) Notwithstanding subsections (7), (8) and (9), the Minister may, if he thinks fit, specify any 
amount to be the average corresponding income in substitution of the amount determined under 
those subsections. 
[48/2004] 
Tax relief period of development and expansion company 
19K. 
—(1) Subject to subsection (3), the tax relief period of a development and expansion company for 
a qualifying activity commences on its commencement day of that qualifying activity and 
continues — 
(a) 
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for such period not exceeding 10 years as the Minister may determine; and 
(b) 
for such further period or periods, not exceeding 5 years for each period, as the Minister may 
determine, where the Minister is satisfied that it is expedient in the public interest to do so and 
subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose. 
[48/2004] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), the Minister may, if the Minister is satisfied that it is expedient in the 
public interest to do so and subject to such conditions as the Minister may impose — 
(a) 
where the certificate issued to a development and expansion company only specifies one qualifying 
activity, extend the tax relief period of the company in subsection (1) for that activity for such 
further period or periods, not exceeding 5 years at any one time, as the Minister may determine; 
or 
(b) 
where the certificate issued to a development and expansion company specifies more than one 
qualifying activity, extend the tax relief period or periods of the company in subsection (1) for one 
or more of those activities for such further period or periods, not exceeding 5 years at any one time, 
as the Minister may determine. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(3) The total tax relief period of a development and expansion company for a qualifying activity 
under subsections (1) and (2) shall not in the aggregate exceed 20 years. 
[48/2004] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(3A) Notwithstanding subsection (3) and subject to subsection (3B), the Minister may, if he is 
satisfied that it is expedient in the public interest to do so and subject to such terms and conditions 
as he may impose, extend the tax relief period of a relevant development and expansion company 
for a qualifying activity (beyond the maximum total period allowed under subsection (3)) for such 
further period or periods, not exceeding l0 years at any one time, as he may determine. 
[Act 2 of 2013 wef 18/02/2008] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(3B) The total tax relief period of a relevant development and expansion company for a qualifying 
activity under subsections (1), (2) and (3A) shall not in the aggregate exceed 40 years. 
[Act 2 of 2013 wef 18/02/2008] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(3C) An extension of the tax relief period of a relevant development and expansion company for 
a qualifying activity under subsection (3A) shall only be granted during the period between 18th 
February 2008 and 17th February 2018 (both dates inclusive). 
[Act 2 of 2013 wef 18/02/2008] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(3D) In subsections (3A), (3B) and (3C), “relevant development and expansion company” means 
a development and expansion company which engages in one or more qualifying activities, and 
oversees, manages or controls the conduct of any activity on a regional or global basis. 
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[Act 2 of 2013 wef 18/02/2008] 
(4) Any tax relief period initially granted to a development and expansion company before the date 
of commencement of the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) (Amendment 
No. 2) Act 2004 which exceeds 10 years shall be deemed to have been granted under this section. 
[48/2004] 
(5) Where a development and expansion company has been granted tax relief under Part IIIA in 
force immediately before the date of commencement of the Economic Expansion Incentives 
(Relief from Income Tax) (Amendment) Act 2004 in respect of any qualifying activity specified 
in the certificate issued under section 19J(2), the Minister shall, in extending the tax relief period 
of the company for that qualifying activity under subsection (1), (2) or (3A), take into account the 
tax relief period of the company for that qualifying activity under that Part. 
[36/96; 11/2004; 48/2004] 
[Act 2 of 2013 wef 18/02/2008] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(6) The Minister must, in extending the tax relief period of a development and expansion company 
for international legal services as defined in section 19KA(3), take into account any tax relief 
period which it enjoyed for such services under section 19KA. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(7) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the tax relief period of a development and expansion 
company that is deemed to be an approved company for the purposes of section 43ZF of the 
Income Tax Act (Cap. 134) under regulations made under that section, shall expire on 1st June 
2011 and shall not be extended. 
[Act 2 of 2013 wef 01/06/2011] 
International legal services 
19KA. 
—(1) If a company engaged in international legal services is approved under section 19J(1) as a 
development and expansion company for those services at any time between 1st April 2010 and 
31st March 2020 (both dates inclusive), then — 
(a) 
despite section 19K(1), (2), (3), (3A) and (3B), the tax relief period of the company for 
international legal services is a non-extendable period of 5 years commencing on its 
commencement day; and 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(b) 
despite section 19J(5C), tax at the rate of 10% is levied and must be paid for each year of 
assessment upon the expansion income derived from the provision of those services by the 
company during its tax relief period for those services. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 01/04/2015] 
(2) This section does not apply to a company approved under section 13V(1) of the Income Tax 
Act (Cap. 134). 
(3) In this section — 
“expansion income” has the meaning given to that expression in section 19J; 
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“international legal services” means any qualifying activity comprising legal services that qualify 
for zero-rating under section 21(3) of the Goods and Services Tax Act (Cap. 117A). 
[Act 1 of 2012 wef 01/04/2010] 
Recovery of tax subject to concessionary rate 
19L. Despite any other provision of this Part, the Comptroller may, subject to section 74 of the 
Income Tax Act (Cap. 134), make an assessment or additional assessment upon a company to 
make good any loss of tax, if it appears to the Comptroller that any income of the company ought 
not to have been taxed at a concessionary rate under section 19J or 19KA. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
Ascertainment of income from qualifying activities 
19M. 
—(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) — 
(a) 
the qualifying income of a development and expansion company derived from a qualifying activity; 
or 
(b) 
where the certificate issued to a development and expansion company under section 19J(2) 
specifies 2 or more qualifying activities, the total qualifying income of the development and 
expansion company derived from all of those qualifying activities, 
is ascertained in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, after making such 
adjustments as may be necessary to give effect to any direction given under section 19P. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(2) In determining the qualifying income of a development and expansion company mentioned in 
subsection (1)(a) or the total qualifying income of a development and expansion company 
mentioned in subsection (1)(b) for the basis period for any year of assessment — 
(a) 
the allowances provided for in sections 16 to 22 of the Income Tax Act for capital expenditure 
incurred for the purposes of the qualifying activity or all the qualifying activities shall be taken 
into account notwithstanding that no claim for such allowances has been made; 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(b) 
the allowances referred to in paragraph (a) for that year of assessment shall firstly be deducted 
against the qualifying income of the company from the qualifying activity or the total qualifying 
income of the company from all the qualifying activities, and any unabsorbed allowances shall be 
deducted against the other income of the company subject to tax at a different rate of tax under 
this Act or the Income Tax Act (Cap. 134) in accordance with subsection (3); 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(c) 
the balance, if any, of the allowances after the deduction in paragraph (b) shall be available for 
deduction for any subsequent year of assessment in accordance with sections 22A and 23 of the 
Income Tax Act and shall be made in the manner provided in that paragraph; 
(d) 
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any loss incurred in carrying out the qualifying activity, or any net loss incurred in carrying out all 
the qualifying activities, for that basis period shall be deducted in accordance with subsection (3) 
against the other income of the company subject to tax at a different rate of tax under this Act or 
the Income Tax Act; 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(e) 
the balance, if any, of the losses after the deduction in paragraph (d) shall be available for 
deduction for any subsequent year of assessment in accordance with section 37 of the Income Tax 
Act firstly against the qualifying income of the company from the qualifying activity or the total 
qualifying income of the company from all the qualifying activities, and any balance of the losses 
shall be deducted against the other income of the company subject to tax at a different rate of tax 
under this Act or the Income Tax Act in accordance with subsection (3); 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(f) 
any unabsorbed donation for that year of assessment shall be deducted in accordance with 
subsection (3) against the other income of the company subject to tax at a different rate of tax 
under this Act or the Income Tax Act; and 
(g) 
the balance, if any, of the donations after the deduction in paragraph (f) shall be available for 
deduction for any subsequent year of assessment in accordance with section 37 of the Income Tax 
Act firstly against the qualifying income of the company from the qualifying activity or the total 
qualifying income of the company from all the qualifying activities, and any balance of the 
donations shall be deducted against the other income of the company subject to tax at a different 
rate of tax under this Act or the Income Tax Act in accordance with subsection (3). 
[11/2004] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(3) Section 37B of the Income Tax Act shall apply, with the necessary modifications, in relation 
to — 
(a) 
the deduction of the allowances provided for in sections 16 to 22 of that Act; and 
(b) 
the losses or donations under section 37 of that Act in respect of — 
(i) 
the qualifying income or the total qualifying income of the development and expansion company; 
and 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
(ii) 
such part of the development and expansion company’s income as is subject to tax at a different 
rate of tax under this Act or the Income Tax Act (Cap. 134). 
[11/2004] 
(4) For the purpose of the application under subsection (3), any reference in section 37B of the 
Income Tax Act to income of a company subject to tax at a higher or lower rate of tax or income 
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of the company subject to tax at a higher or lower rate of tax, as the case may be, shall be read as 
a reference to the qualifying income or the total qualifying income of the development and 
expansion company. 
[11/2004] 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
Ascertainment of income from other trade or business 
19N. 
—(1) Where at any time — 
(a) 
during the tax relief period of a development and expansion company for a qualifying activity; or 
(b) 
where the certificate issued to the development and expansion company under section 19J(2) 
specifies 2 or more qualifying activities, during the longer or longest of the tax relief periods of 
the company for those qualifying activities, 
the development and expansion company carries on any trade or business other than the qualifying 
activity or activities, separate accounts must be maintained for that other trade or business and in 
respect of the same accounting period; and the income from that other trade or business must be 
computed and assessed in accordance with the Income Tax Act (Cap. 134) with such adjustments 
as the Comptroller thinks reasonable and proper. 
(2) Where, in the opinion of the Comptroller, the carrying on of such other trade or business is 
subordinate or incidental to the carrying on of the qualifying activity or activities, the income or 
loss arising from such other trade or business is considered to form part of the income or loss of 
the company from that qualifying activity or the total income or total loss of the company from 
those qualifying activities. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
Deduction of losses 
19O. The Minister may, in relation to development and expansion companies, by regulations 
provide for — 
(a) 
the manner in which expenses, capital allowances and donations allowable under the Income Tax 
Act are to be deducted; and 
(b) 
the deduction of capital allowances, losses and donations otherwise than in accordance with 
sections 23 and 37 of the Income Tax Act (Cap. 134). 
[11/2004] 
Power to give directions 
19P. For the purposes of this Act and the Income Tax Act, the Comptroller may direct that — 
(a) 
any sum payable to a development and expansion company in its tax relief period for a qualifying 
activity which might reasonably and properly have been expected to be payable, in the normal 
course of business, after the end of that period shall be treated as not having been payable in that 
period but as having been payable on such date, after that period, as the Comptroller thinks fit; and 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
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(b) 
any expense incurred by a development and expansion company in respect of a qualifying activity 
within one year after the end of the tax relief period for that activity which might reasonably and 
properly have been expected to be incurred, in the normal course of business, during that tax relief 
period, is to be treated — 
(i) 
as not having been incurred within that year; but  
(ii) 
as having been incurred for the purposes of that qualifying activity and on such date during that 
tax relief period as the Comptroller thinks fit. 
[Act 11 of 2016 wef 19/04/2016] 
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